

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND  
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION**

**SECURITY INDEX**

**FILE NUMBER: 100-358086**

**SECTION NUMBER: 15**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

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## NOTICE

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: July 23, 1951

FROM : SAC, MEMPHIS

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Reference SAC Letter # 100, dated 12-28-50.

A review of the Security Index cards, maintained in the Memphis Division, has been made and they are found to be in an up-to-date status. The addresses of the S. I. subjects have recently been verified.



762  
changed  
to  
56-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/13/51

FROM : SAC, Norfolk

SUBJECT: PROSECUTIVE SUMMARIES  
Security Index Subjects  
IS - C

This office is presently working on a program whereby prosecutive summaries will be prepared on all SI subjects in the Norfolk office which raises a question as to whether at the same time the Bureau will desire a possible press release summary report for the attention of inasmuch as there is no indication at the present time that the Department is contemplating "pickup" activities on these individuals. Advise as to whether such prosecutive summaries should be followed by informative summaries as noted above.



762  
changed  
to  
56-11

SAC, Norfolk

September 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PROSECUTIVE SUMMARIES  
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C  
Norfolk file  
Bufile

Reurlet dated August 13, 1951.

It is not desired that press release summaries be prepared at this time in all Security Index cases. The preparation of summary reports in all Security Index cases is highly desirable. At the time of the preparation of each summary report, the case should be brought up to date and thoroughly analyzed to be sure that we are fully justified in the retention of the Security Index card.

763

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: AUGUST 13, 1951

FROM : SAC, OMAHA


PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

ReBuLet July 25, 1951.

Receipt is acknowledged of the new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

I have personally destroyed the old list by burning.



THE DIRECTOR

June 7, 1951

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAMGENERALPURPOSE

To answer your inquiries raised in connection with the attached memorandum from \_\_\_\_\_ to me dated May 31, 1951, regarding the standards for apprehension under the captioned program.

DETAILS

With regard to your comment that we should keep after this until all questions are properly resolved, you are advised that we have now received another memorandum from the Department setting forth their revised standards. We will carefully review the Departmental memorandum for the purpose of comparing the standards set forth with our present standards, after which we will prepare the necessary memorandum to the Department with our observations. This matter will be carefully followed to be certain that all questions are properly resolved to our satisfaction.

You inquired as to what our files reflected concerning the five Departmental attorneys who constitute a board within the Department and who are reviewing cases involving Security Index subjects. Pursuant to your request, there are attached individual memoranda reflecting information in our files concerning these five individuals, namely.

With regard to your third inquiry as to whether we could obtain the names of the attorneys who are actually making the reviews, you are advised that the necessary arrangements have been made and as soon as the identities of these attorneys are obtained, their names will be searched through our files and you will be advised of the results.

ACTION

None. This is for your information and as soon as our analysis of the revised standards sent to us by the Department is completed, the same will be made available to you.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 15, 1951

FROM :

(nr)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS  
SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise concerning the present standards for initiating security investigations.

DETAILS

I. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

A. Background

Prior to April 18, 1945, the Bureau directed its investigative efforts in the Communist field towards complete coverage of all phases of that type of activity. By SAC Letter No. 40, Series 1945, dated April 18, 1945, the field was instructed that it was then desired that emphasis be placed on those cases involving the more important individuals and organizations, such as key figure cases, basic bodies of the Communist Political Association and closely adjoined groups, the extent of Communist infiltration of foreign language groups and labor organizations and such special cases as Cinrad and Comrap.

That SAC Letter pointed out: (1) that future opening of Communist cases should be on a selective basis and that a sizeable reduction in the number of security matter cases could be accomplished by limiting those under investigation to subjects then currently regarded as dangerous or potentially dangerous; (2) that mere membership in a Communist organization did not justify the conclusion that a subject was potentially dangerous; (3) that mere membership added to occasional attendance at meetings was not sufficient to indicate potential dangerousness.

By SAC Letter No. 44, Series 1947, dated April 17, 1947, under the caption "Redirection of Communist Investigations," the field was directed to re-evaluate investigations





in the field of Communism because of the shortage of personnel. It pointed out that the Bureau was not de-emphasizing its Communist program but was placing greater emphasis on development of live sources of information and less emphasis on individual investigations as such. In connection with Security Matter - C investigations, that SAC Letter instructed the field that such investigations should not be opened based on Party membership alone. It instructed: (1) that when information is received that an individual, identified as a member of the CP or related groups, is dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security, a case should be opened and investigation conducted; (2) that membership alone was not to be construed as rendering an individual dangerous or potentially dangerous, but in addition to membership, statements or acts of a Party member indicating dangerousness should be present prior to opening a case for active investigative attention.

SAC Letter Number 57, Series 1948, dated April 10, 1948, instructed the Field to take stock immediately of their state of preparedness for the possible detention of Communists in the event of an emergency. Among other instructions in taking stock of the situation, the letter directed all Special Agents in Charge to review their security files for the purpose of considering for investigation and the Security Index all persons considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security based on activity or affiliation with subversive organizations plus other factors such as employment or training as set forth hereinafter under C, Category 2. On the basis of this review, cases were opened and individuals were placed in the Security Index when dangerousness was so determined.

The above policy remained in effect until SAC Letter Number 48, dated July 25, 1950, which instructed the field that they should open cases for investigation on all individuals reported as present or alleged members of, or affiliated with, the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. Prior to SAC Letter Number 48, cases were not opened on mere membership in or affiliation with such organizations in the absence of other indications that the individual was dangerous or potentially dangerous due to Party training, employment in vital industry or defense installations, past service in the Armed Forces or other similar categories.

B. General Observations

From the information set out above it is apparent from April 18, 1945, until July 25, 1950, membership alone in a subversive organization, without additional information indicating dangerousness, was not sufficient to warrant the opening of a security investigation, according to Bureau policy in effect during that period.

Undoubtedly, there are thousands of individuals reported as Party members during 1945 through 1949 who have never been investigated from a security standpoint because their cases did not meet the standards for opening a case during that period and information concerning their subversive activities ceased sometime before the standards were changed on July 25, 1950. The exception would be where investigations have been initiated for special reasons, as present employment in the Federal Government, special requests from other Government agencies, or other information prompting an investigation such as employment in vital facilities. As indicated above, SAC Letter Number 48, dated July 25, 1950, instructed the field to open investigations on individuals, who were present, active, participating members of the CP or other revolutionary groups or were affiliated or espoused the lines of those groups.

It is fully realized that each case must be considered on its own set of facts and that many factors are involved; however, it is believed that this matter should be fully considered to determine whether our present procedures for conducting investigations are sound, taking into consideration the present work load on the field in investigating and considering for the Security Index persons presently active or affiliated with subversive groups.

It is pointed out that any individual who is ever reported a member of a subversive group, in the absence of specific evidence of disaffection, has the potential to be dangerous and may commit sabotage and espionage if the circumstances dictate; however, we must direct our investigative efforts towards completing



investigations in cases where the potential of dangerousness is greatest, as we see it, before opening cases on all subversive complaints received through the years.

C. Standards Re Opening of Security Investigations

The primary responsibility for opening security investigations is on the field because the field is in the best position to evaluate all facts available to determine if an investigation is warranted and whether an individual is dangerous or potentially dangerous. Certain guideposts have been set up to cover generally the cases when security investigations should be initiated by the field and these are set out as follows:

Category 1. Security investigations are opened on all individuals reported, since the Korean situation, as present or alleged members of or affiliated with the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the Independent Socialist League or revolutionary groups.

Observation

The above instructions issued to the Field by SAC Letter Number 43 dated July 25, 1950, makes it mandatory for the Field to open investigations on complaints alleging subversive activity since the Korean situation regardless of leadership in the subversive groups, past activities or present employment.

Category 2. In addition to cases where there are allegations of present activity or affiliation with subversive groups, security investigations are opened by the Field on all persons who prior to the Korean situation were members or were affiliated or closely associated with and under the discipline of the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the Independent Socialist League or other revolutionary groups when there are additional factors which indicate the persons are dangerous or potentially dangerous.



While there are no inflexible standards for measuring dangerousness, the Field has been instructed to consider factors such as the following:

- (1) Administrative heads and officials of subversive organizations.
- (2) Persons with considerable training and experience in the organization.
- (3) Training in special schools of the organization.
- (4) Involvement in espionage or intelligence networks.
- (5) Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
- (6) Veterans of O.S.S. or veterans of other branches of the U. S. Armed Forces.
- (7) Employees in public utilities, radio stations, communication and transportation industries.
- (8) Employment in other basic, strategic or vital industries.
- (9) Individuals who have access to explosives, chemicals, weapons or ammunition.
- (10) Organizers or officials in labor unions, especially in public utilities or other strategic or vital industries.
- (11) Employees of Municipal, State or Federal Governments.
- (12) Individuals who are employed in positions having espionage or sabotage potentials.
- (13) Individuals who have served as couriers or mail drops.
- (14) Individuals who have served as strong-arm-men in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.

- (15) Individuals who hold strategic positions in front organizations or other mass organizations or in press, radio, motion pictures or other educational media, or are otherwise influential in organizing or mobilizing elements sympathetic to or in propagating the line or affairs in the interest of the subversive organization.

Observation

The Field must consider each case on its own facts in determining whether an investigation should be initiated. The purpose of a security investigation is to ascertain the extent of the subject's subversive activities to determine whether the subject's name should be placed on the Security Index and the standards for opening investigations generally follow the same standards used in considering a person for the Security Index.

The ideal situation would be to conduct a security investigation on every derogatory, subversive complaint ever received by the Bureau. Of course, we do not have the manpower to do this at this time. We must work now on the cases where the most dangerousness appears, namely, (1) active participation in subversive affairs since the Korean situation or (2) past activity plus employment or training as outlined under category 2 above.

We must face the fact that the Redirection Program which was in effect from April 18, 1945, until July 25, 1950, de-emphasized the investigation of individuals and that when there was an allegation of mere membership in subversive groups during those years we did not investigate the complaint in the absence of some specific reason. There had to be membership plus something else as indicated under category 2.

We must bear in mind that since we broadened the basis for opening security investigations by SAC Letter Number 48 dated July 25, 1950, we have opened 52,893 security matters in classification and closed 37,345 matters or a net increase of 15,548 pending matters. The total pending classification matters as of August 1, 1950, was 12,251 as compared with 27,799 pending matters in that classification as of May 1, 1950. SAC Letter Number 48 purposely set out additional basis for investigation "present or alleged members of or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups," thus not requiring the Field to open cases on persons who were routine members in the past, to have done otherwise would have placed a burden on the Field which could not have been handled. The number of pending security matters continues to increase under our present instructions, therefore, it does not appear sensible to instruct the Field to review their files and open cases on the basis of routine membership or affiliation information received during the period of the Redirection Program and not investigated then. We may come to this later although it would be a highly inefficient method of determining persons now potentially dangerous.

D. Employment in Key Vital Facilities

During the period between April 18, 1945 and July 25, 1950, there was no definite designation or identification as to basic, strategic or vital industries. Today, key vital facilities have been designated by the Secretary of Defense. The possibility exists that individuals against whom subversive allegations were received or who were identified as mere Party members but not investigated during the above years, may today be employed in facilities listed by the Secretary of Defense. Likewise, subjects of security cases who were investigated but not placed on the Security Index, unknown to us may now be employed in vital facilities.

Name checks on all persons employed in key vital facilities would be the most practical way to ascertain whether persons, on whom we have derogatory security information, are so employed, because such checks would disclose all information regardless of whether we had conducted investigations or not. This would be a continuing job due to the millions of persons now in industry and the turnover of labor. The proposed Munitions Board Name Check Program of two million names would be partially effective.

E. Examples

I want to call your attention to the following examples of instances where no security investigations have ever been conducted:

No security investigation has ever been conducted of . The Philadelphia Office by memorandum dated December 12, 1945, advised the Bureau that a confidential informant had furnished information received from an officer of a section of the Communist Party at Philadelphia that was a member of the Communist Party. Information available in the Bureau files indicates that participated in the activities of various Communist Party front organizations from 1944 through 1947. He offered his services to the Bureau as reported in a memorandum from Mr. to Mr. dated December 7, 1950, to which Mr. commented: "We want nothing to do with him."

At the time the derogatory information concerning Party membership was reported, the Field did not initiate an investigation because under the then existing Bureau policy mere membership was not construed as making an individual dangerous or potentially dangerous. He has not been investigated to date because there is no derogatory information available since 1947 and there is no indication of past membership coupled with position, Party training or leadership as outlined under category 2 under C above, sufficient to warrant the investigation.

Reference is made to memorandum dated April 17, 1951, from [redacted] to the Director, attached, in which an explanation was set out as to the captioned individuals who never have been investigated to which the Director agreed with the comments of [redacted] that: "We should reconsider our policy as I believe we should have opened cases on these individuals."

The facts in this matter are set out briefly as follows: An anonymous complaint was forwarded to the Bureau from the Department on December 27, 1950, which complaint indicated that while these subjects were employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in New York City, prior to their resignation from that employment in 1944, they were members of the Communist Party.

These persons are presently being investigated by the New York Office but only because of the interest of the McCarran Committee in the subject matter. In the absence of the interest of the McCarran Committee, a security investigation would not have been initiated today on receipt of a complaint of this type when file searches failed to indicate current derogatory information and no indications of Party position, leadership, training or employment in vital industry as indicated under category 2 under C above.

Although the complaint was recently received, the derogatory information reported dates back at least to 1944. In cases of this type, investigations are not being opened at the present time in the absence of some other reason whether the source of the information is anonymous or reliable. To conduct an investigation based on this old information in the absence of some special reason would be a complete reversal of our present policy and will mean that all derogatory complaints received over the years will have to be opened for investigation. Although as pointed out in the memorandum of April 17, 1951, that would be an ideal situation but it is not



believed that it is practical at this time as the Field is presently unable to cope with its present case load in the Security Field. It may be possible to conduct investigations of this type at some future date when the case load is in a more current condition.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that for the time being we continue our present policy for opening security cases as outlined under C above.

ACTION

If you approve, an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared to re-state instructions to the Field regarding opening of security investigations along the lines of the above recommendation.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 30, 1951

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS; SECURITY INDEX -

On June 28, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

and considered whether we should open security investigations on the basis of complaints received now alleging Communist activities some years ago; on the basis of allegations in our files which were not investigated at the time under the Redirection Program; and, on the basis of anonymous complaints.

In order that a clear understanding may be had concerning the background of Bureau policy in opening security investigations, there is attached a memorandum reflecting the various SAC Letters since April 18, 1945, instructing the field as to what individuals should be investigated in security matter investigations.

Bureau Instructions to the Field:

Briefly, prior to April 18, 1945, the Bureau attempted to secure complete coverage in the Communist field. On April 18, 1945, the field was told to place emphasis on the more important individuals and organizations; that Communist cases should be opened on a selective basis and the number of security cases could be reduced by limiting investigations to subjects regarded as dangerous or potentially dangerous; that mere membership or occasional attendance at meetings was not sufficient to indicate potential dangerousness.

On April 17, 1947, the Redirection Program was put into effect and the field was told to reevaluate investigations in the Communist field because of shortage of personnel. Party membership alone was not sufficient basis for investigation; investigations should be restricted to dangerous or potentially dangerous Party members whose statements or acts indicate dangerousness.

On April 10, 1948, the field was instructed to take stock of its state of preparedness for a detention program in the event of an emergency; to review security files and open investigations on dangerous and potentially dangerous persons, based on activity or affiliation with subversive organizations, plus certain standards,

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

such as position in the Party, training, involvement in espionage, employment in vital industry, military training, etc. In effect, this set the basis for the field as to who should be considered dangerous or potentially dangerous and resulted in opening or re-opening thousands of cases not investigated under the Redirection Program.

On July 25, 1950, because of the Korean situation and the international tension, the field was instructed to open cases on all individuals reported as present or alleged members of, or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. The basis for this change was that because the Communist Party and related subversive groups came out strongly for Soviet Russia and North Korea in the Korean incident, any persons continuing as members of these groups or espousing their line should be considered as dangerous or potentially dangerous.

Observations:

From the information set out above, it is apparent that from April 18, 1945, until July 25, 1950, membership alone in a subversive organization, without additional information indicating dangerousness, was not sufficient to warrant the opening of a security investigation, according to Bureau policy in effect during that period.

Undoubtedly, there are thousands of individuals reported as Party members during 1945 through 1949 who have never been investigated from a security standpoint because their cases did not meet the standards for opening a case during that period and information concerning their subversive activities ceased sometime before the standards were changed on July 25, 1950. The exception would be where investigations have been initiated for special reasons, as present employment in the Federal Government, special requests from other Government agencies, or other information prompting an investigation such as employment in vital facilities. As indicated above, SAC Letter No. 48, dated July 25, 1950, instructed the field to open investigations on individuals, who were present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups or were affiliated or espoused the lines of those groups.

It is fully realized that each case must be considered on its own set of facts and that many factors are involved; however, it is believed that this matter should be fully considered to determine whether our present procedures for conducting investigations are sound, taking into consideration the present work load on the field in investigating and considering for the Security Index persons presently active or affiliated with subversive groups.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

It is pointed out that any individual who has ever reported a member of a subversive group, in the absence of specific evidence of disaffection, has the potential to be dangerous and may commit sabotage and espionage if the circumstances dictate; however, we must direct our investigative efforts towards completing investigations in cases where the potential of dangerousness is greatest, as we see it, before opening cases on all subversive complaints received through the years.

Standards for Security Cases  
Presently Being Opened:

(1) SAC Letter #48 dated July 25, 1950, is the basis for the opening of security cases on all individuals reported as present members of or affiliated with Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. The field does not open cases on allegations received today alleging membership or affiliation with these groups prior to July 25, 1950 unless the information furnished alleges more than mere membership or affiliation with the groups, that is, the allegation includes activities, training, etc., which coupled with membership indicates the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

(2) Security cases are opened on all persons who, prior to the Korean situation, were members of or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups if there are additional factors which indicate that these persons are dangerous or potentially dangerous. In determining whether a person is potentially dangerous, the field has been furnished a number of factors such as high position in a subversive organization, special training, involvement in espionage, membership in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Armed Forces training, employment in vital industry, public utilities or Government, etc.

Observations:

The field considers each case on its own facts in determining whether an investigation should be initiated to ascertain whether the subject's activities warrant placing him on the Security Index. The ideal situation would be to conduct a security investigation on every derogatory subversive complaint ever received by the Bureau. We do not have the manpower to do this. We must work now on the cases where the most dangerousness appears, namely, active participation in subversive affairs since the Korean situation or past activity plus employment or training, as mentioned above.

We must face the fact that the Redirection Program which was in effect until July 25, 1950, de-emphasized the investigation

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

of individuals and when there was an allegation of mere membership in subversive groups, we did not investigate the complaint in the absence of some other specific reason.

We must bear in mind that since we broadened the basis for opening security investigations by SAC Letter No. 48 dated July 25, 1950, we have opened 52,899 security matters in classification and closed 37,245 matters, or a net increase of 15,548 pending matters. The total pending classification matters as of August 1, 1950, was 12,251 as compared with 27,799 pending matters in that classification as of May 1, 1951. SAC Letter No. 48 purposely set out additional basis for investigation of "Present or alleged members of or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups," thus not requiring the field to open cases on persons who were routine members in the past. To have done otherwise would have placed a burden on the field which could not have been handled. The number of pending security matters continues to increase under our present instructions. Therefore, it does not appear sensible to instruct the field to review their files and open cases on the basis of routine membership or affiliation information received during the period of the Redirection Program and not investigated then. We may come to this later, although it would be a highly inefficient method of determining persons now potentially dangerous.

Employment in Key Vital Facilities:

During the period between April 18, 1945 and July 25, 1950, there was no definite designation or identification as to basic, strategic or vital industries. Today, key vital facilities have been designated by the Secretary of Defense. The possibility exists that individuals against whom subversive allegations were received or who were identified as mere Party members but not investigated during the above years, may today be employed in facilities listed by the Secretary of Defense. Likewise, subjects of security cases who were investigated but not placed on the Security Index, unknown to us, may now be employed in vital facilities.

Name checks on all persons employed in key vital facilities would be the most practical way to ascertain whether persons on whom we have derogatory security information are so employed because such checks would disclose all information regardless of whether we had conducted investigations or not. This would be a continuing job due to the millions of persons now in industry and the turnover of labor. The proposed Munitions Board Name Check Program of two million names would be partially effective.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Anonymous Complaints:

Anonymous complaints alleging subversive activity have been treated in the same manner as any other complaint, with the exception that because the complainant refuses to sign his name, we do not place the same credence in the complaint as we do in those cases where we can go back to the complainant for more detail and for leads to prove or disprove the complaint. In addition, many anonymous complaints are the result of spite and the fact that the complainant does not sign his name indicates that he will not back up his complaint with facts. Where the anonymous complaint is sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation, an investigation is opened, but we do not place the same weight on an anonymous complaint as we do when a complainant makes his identity known.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended:

(1) that we do not attempt to go back through our files to resurrect complaints received prior to the Korean situation for the purpose of opening investigative cases. To do so would result in the opening of thousands of cases which the conference felt is not warranted, particularly as we have conducted investigation on those persons whose activities were such as to cause them to be considered dangerous or potentially dangerous;

(2) that we should not open a case on information currently received, alleging subversive activities prior to the Korean situation, unless the allegations go beyond mere membership or association with the Communist Party or related groups and include information such as training, employment in vital industry, Government position, etc., which warrant the investigation on the basis of a potential dangerousness. This policy is in effect at the present time;

(3) that we do open investigations on allegations currently received reflecting membership in subversive organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949. This would be an exception to the general rule under number 2, above, and is warranted because the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 call for action in an emergency against individuals who were members of the Communist Party subsequent to January 1, 1949. The Conference felt that as Congress set the date January 1, 1949, in the Internal Security Act of 1950, we should conduct investigations based on allegations of mere membership subsequent to that date, but we are warranted in not going back beyond that date on the basis that Congressional intent is reflected in the Act. Instructions are under preparation for the field in this respect.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(4) that in the instructions to the field the matter of anonymous complaints be covered, namely, to the effect that merely because a complaint is anonymous the complaint should not be disregarded, but the facts of the complaint should be considered and if they are sufficiently specific, an investigation should be opened.

If you approve the Executives' Conference recommendations, we will be so governed.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

gh.  
D.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM :  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

DATE: June 26, 1951

Reference is made to memorandum of June 8, 1951, setting forth the differences between the standards applied by the Bureau in placing persons on the security index, and the standards forwarded to us by the Department, which they are going to use in reviewing our cases. In accordance with the recommendation in that memorandum, Section Chief [redacted], Supervisor [redacted] and I conferred on June 25 with Department representatives all of whom are working on this program.

It was apparent from our discussion with these gentlemen that the Department has not, as yet, instituted a full review of our cases, but, rather, has reviewed samples of the cases, and is presently engaged in going over the cases involving prominent individuals. I again requested to be furnished the list of attorneys who would review these cases, and [redacted] advised he would furnish the list to us.

We started the discussion with these gentlemen by pointing out the wide disparity between the standards proposed by the Department and the standards which have been applied by the FBI during the application of the security index program. We took up several points wherein the Department's standards varied widely from ours, particularly the fact that the Department's standards do not include membership in and association with subversive organizations other than the Communist Party. They acknowledged this to be in error. Again, item 5a of the Department's standards, if literally applied as a directive from the Department, could require placing on the index all Communists who were members of the Party prior to 1949, on the presumption that any member of the Party receives some training and had knowledge of the aims of the organization. It was pointed out to [redacted] that this standard is extremely broad, and in a matter of such importance as this program the standards, as written, should stand the test of analysis, so that they cannot be misconstrued. The Department representatives recognized this.

Several of the other discrepancies and variances which we noted from our comparison were discussed with these gentlemen. However, it became very apparent to us that the



proper analysis and thought had not been given to the Department's standards, in keeping with the importance of this program. For this reason, I advised them along the following lines:

(1) That since the inception of this program there had been close liaison between the Bureau and the Department, and the Bureau had taken no steps without the Department's approval.

In September 1949, at the Department's request, we furnished to the Department a detailed list of the standards we were utilizing in placing individuals on the security index; that the Department in no way had dissented from these standards and, in fact, during oral discussions, had expressed no criticism whatsoever of them.

(3) In July 1950, we again advised the Department of additional standards being applied to this program in view of the Korean situation. Again the Department made no objection.

(4) In view of the extreme broadness of the "standards" set forth in the Department's portfolio for the emergency detention program, on May 11, 1951, we sent a memorandum to the Department specifically asking for approval of our standards and for Department approval of our concept of this program; namely, apprehension should be restricted to those persons deemed dangerous.

(5) We have not received a proper reply to our memorandum of May 11, as the Department has not specifically approved our standards nor answered whether the Department approves our concept of the program.

(6) The standards which the Department intends to apply in a review of these cases, as set forth in its memorandum of June 1, approaches the detention program from an entirely different viewpoint than contemplated by the Department's apprehension program worked up over the last few years. The proposed Department standards are mainly based on the Internal Security Act of 1950, which the Department has repeatedly told us will not take

the place of the Department's emergency detention program. The Department's efforts to apply standards based on the Internal Security Act of 1950 have resulted in wide variances between the standards applied by the Bureau in building up the security index and the Department's standards. The Bureau's standards, which have the Department's tacit approval, are based on detaining persons who may be dangerous to this country in time of emergency, and the security index has been painstakingly and carefully worked up on a restrictive basis, following these standards.

(7) Before we will change these standards in any respect, we want definite written instructions from the Department. Further, inasmuch as the Bureau is operating under Departmental authority on this program, we must have prompt approval of the Department on the standards which we are to apply. The responsibility for this program definitely lies with the Department, and the Bureau has neither the authority nor the desire to place in effect a program without definite Department authority.

(8) Because of the disparity between the standards which we have applied, based on this carefully worked up program, and the standards suggested by the Department, we will set forth the differences in writing to the Department, and we would like to have a complete and definite understanding regarding these standards from the Department in writing.

ACTION:

Attached hereto is a memorandum to the Department.

Because the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 call for action against persons who have been members of the Communist Party since January 1, 1949, I do think we should instruct our field offices to open investigations where allegations have been received

regarding membership of an individual in the Communist Party or any subversive group since January 1, 1949. The field was furnished copies of the McCarran Act some time ago and is aware of this provision, and undoubtedly many such cases have been opened. However, I think we should issue specific instructions in this regard. Such instructions are being prepared.

Jensen.  
x.

7/7/51

THE DIRECTOR

JOINT COMMITTEE

SUGGESTION #770  
EMPLOYEE:SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE  
FORM FD-128 AND SECURITY FLASHES

MEMBERS PRESENT:

SUGGESTION:

GENERAL

To change Form FD-128, the form changing the office of origin, when a Security Index subject has moved from one Field Division to another so that there will be included there a notation to the effect that a Security Flash has been placed with the Identification Division by the original office of origin.

The Internal Security Section of the Security Division recommends favorable consideration of this suggestion.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

The Joint Committee feels that this suggestion would facilitate the supervision of these cases and put the new office of origin on notice as to the exact status of the matter relative to Security Flashes. This notation will also save the writing of another letter by the new office of origin. They will put the Identification Division on notice as to the new office to be notified in the event information is received at the Seat of Government relative to the Subject.

The Joint Committee felt that until the present supply of forms has been exhausted the notation relative to the Security Flash should be typed on the old form. When the new form is prepared, appropriate provisions will be made for this entry.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

The Executives Conference of 7-9-51, consisting of Messrs. /s/  
recommended unanimously favorable.

Respectfully,

768  
changed  
to  
38-13

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Phoenix

DATE: 8/16/51

AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS-  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

ReSalet #73 (A), 7/24/51.

The designated files therein have been reviewed and  
46 cases have been opened pursuant to these instructions.

769  
changed  
to  
52-11

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 14, 1951

FROM : SAC, Springfield

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter #73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951, Sub-Section A.

This is to advise that the review of the necessary files in this office mentioned in referenced letter is being made at this time and it is contemplated that the Bureau will be advised by September 1, 1951, of the results of this review and the total number of cases which we have open pursuant to the instructions in referenced letter.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 27, 1951.

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS- GENERAL

There is attached hereto a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of July 17, 1951.





# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 22, 1951

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL  
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

The Executives Conference on May 22, 1951 with Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_ being present considered the following additional matters concerning the Security Index.

1. Re summary reports on Security Index subjects. There are over 15,000 names in the Security Index. Summary reports have been prepared or instructions have been issued for them to be prepared on: Prominent Individuals 33; Espionage subjects 52; subjects of possible prosecution 77; total 172. In addition, a number of offices such as Miami have sent in summary reports on their Security Index subjects. There are some additional cases on top functionaries on which several summary reports have been prepared although the requirement for these summaries was discontinued in December, 1950. Some of the more complicated cases and most of the voluminous cases have summary reports in them.

The Security Index cards do not contain a summary of the substantive information concerning the subjects. The field recommends that a subject be placed in the Security Index by use of a form which usually accompanies a report which contains enough substantive data to justify the recommendation. A number of files, selected at random, were examined and a majority, based on this sampling, appeared to be files of 1 to 3 reports containing substantive data with additional miscellaneous serials therein. The percentage of all the Security Index subject files which contain summaries was described as "negligible."

It is the Department's plan that after the arrest of Security Index subjects, the presentation of the facts to any administrative board will be made by the U. S. Attorney. U. S. Attorneys do not now receive copies of the Bureau's reports on these cases. The task of submitting the individual reports to the U. S. Attorney after these thousands of subjects have been apprehended will in itself entail a great deal of work and a summarization or compilation of pertinent data from these reports by the U. S. Attorney will also be a heavy task for them. The preparation of summary reports in each instance would entail considerable file reviews, dictation, or transcription to such an extent that it would probably slow down appreciably the practice of submitting recommendations of names for the Security Index.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

The Executives Conference was of the opinion that nothing should be done to appreciably slow down the present rate of production. It recognized that there were perhaps many cases where summary reports would be advantageous. A summary report prepared at this time might have to be supplemented if subsequent, substantive information is received. It was therefore unanimously recommended that since on Saturday, May 26, SAC's of New York, of Newark and of San Francisco will be in Washington at the Joint Committee meeting that this matter be considered by them with a view to submitting recommendations that would not slow down production in the field and yet keep the Bureau's interests adequately protected with summary reports where good judgment indicates they are advisable. This will be reconsidered by the Executives Conference after the Joint Committee has made its recommendations.

- 2. It was unanimously recommended in view of the large number of New Agents who have recently gone to the field that the SAC of each office review with all Agents the procedures and plans in connection with the Detcom Program; that the Inspector be requested to check into the adequacy of the instruction to all the Agents of the office during each inspection and that the Security Index Detcom Program be listed on the agenda for the Regional SAC Conferences.

The following recommendations set forth in the attached Executives Conference Memorandum prepared by and which have not otherwise been disposed of are recommended.

Should the field be required to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects at this time?

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since the field is now submitting reports on 1,500 key figures each six months; since 3,600 subjects have been added to the Security Index since June, 1950; and since the field has been instructed to submit reports on 2,000 SI subjects in vital facilities; in order to avoid slowing down the Security Index Program it was unanimously recommended that we not require the field to submit current reports on all Security Index Subjects but that this matter be re-surveyed on September 1, 1951.

- 4. Should we retain persons on the Security Index where no activity has been shown for several years?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since it has not been possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a number of Security Index subjects who were placed on the list several years ago and as it was the opinion that it would be a greater risk to remove the names than to retain them on the list as many of them may be "sleepers", it was recommended that the names be retained on the list unless there was some positive development justifying contrary action.

5. Should we refer to the Department cases for specific decisions where we do not have evidence of activity for several years?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since the Bureau has called upon the Department to review the reports on all Security Index subjects it was felt unnecessary to refer these cases specifically to the Department.

6. Should we interview individuals carried on the Security Index on whom we have developed no current activities?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

The Conference unanimously recommended against automatically interviewing these individuals merely because of the passage of time. If a justifiable reason exists for interviewing a subject it should be done but not automatically on this basis.

7. As a result of current investigations we develop information of past Communist activity but not current activity by individuals. Such individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they do not meet our standards for the Index. Should we interview them to determine their present attitude?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

It was unanimously recommended that in instances where the Bureau develops information that a subject engaged in routine Communist activities several years ago but there is no evidence of current CP activities, we should interview the subject with a view to developing pertinent information as to attitude, cooperativeness and potential dangerousness of this subject who would then be considered for the Security Index.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*OK*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: June 4, 1951

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX GENERAL  
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURESPURPOSE

To advise of action taken in line with the recommendations of the Executives' Conference.

DETAILS

The Executives' Conference memorandum dated May 22, 1951, is attached.

The following action is being taken in regard to the seven points covered in that memorandum:

1. No action is being taken until the Executives' Conference reconsiders the matter of summary reports in all Security Index cases, after the Joint Committee has considered the matter.

2.(a) A proposed No Number SAC Letter is attached reinstructing the Field to be certain the procedures and plans in connection with the Emergency Detention Program have been reviewed with all Agents including all new Agents who have recently gone to the Field.

For your information, No Number SAC Letter dated October 4, 1950, instructed all Special Agents in Charge to advise Agents concerning pertinent instructions then available to the Field by No Number SAC Letters dated July 11 and August 15, 1950, and No Number SAC Letter dated April 4, 1951, instructed SACs to have conferences with all Agents to thoroughly discuss the contents of that letter.

(b) It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division in regard to the Executives' Conference recommendation that the Inspector be requested to check into the adequacy of instructions to all Agents during each inspection in regard to the Emergency Detention Program.

(c) The Executives' Conference recommended that the Security Index Emergency Detention Program be listed on the agenda for Regional SAC Conferences, however by SAC Letter Number 54, Series 1951, dated May 29, 1951, under (A), plans for holding regional conferences were cancelled.

Pal

No action is being taken on this point.

3. Should the Field be required to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects at this time?

In accordance with the Executives' Conference recommendation, this matter will be re-surveyed September 1, 1951, and recommendations will then be resubmitted to the Executives' Conference on this point.

4. Should we retain persons on the Security Index where no activity has been shown for several years?

The attached proposed SAC Letter includes instructions that when it is not possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a subject presently carried on the Security Index, the name should be continued in the Security Index unless there is positive development justifying contrary action.

5. Should we refer to the Department Security Index cases for specific decisions where we do not have evidence of activity for several years?

The Bureau has called upon the Department to review the reports on all Security Index cases and no additional action is necessary on this point.

6. Should we interview individuals carried on the Security Index on which we have developed no current activities?

The Executives' Conference recommendation against automatically interviewing subjects carried on the Security Index on whom we have developed no current activities during current investigations is a continuation of existing policy and present instructions to the Field and no further action is necessary on this point. If a justifiable reason exists for interviewing the subject presently on the Security Index, the Field submits a request to conduct the interview but this is not presently done on an automatic basis.

7. Should we interview individuals to determine their present attitude, cooperativeness and potential dangerousness when current investigations develop information of routine Communist activities several years ago but no current Communist Party activities and the individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they do not meet our standards in that matter?

The proposed SAC Letter includes instructions on the Executives' Conference recommendation that a subject not presently on the Security Index should be interviewed after prior Bureau authorization with a view to developing pertinent information as to attitude, cooperativeness and potential dangerousness when the investigation develops information that the subject engaged in routine Communist Party activities several years ago but there is no evidence of current Communist Party activity.

ACTION

If you approve,

1. There is attached a proposed SAC Letter in accordance with the recommendation under 2, 4 and 7 above.
2. It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division in connection with the Executives' Conference recommendation under 2 (b) above.
3. That the point raised under 1 above be referred to the Joint Committee for consideration.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 7/6/51

FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL  
POLICY AND PROCEDURES

MEMBERS PRESENT: Messrs.

The Executives Conference on 5/22/51, recommended that the Joint Committee of Field and Seat of Government Representatives consider the advisability of the Field being requested to submit summary reports on Security Index subjects.

It was pointed out that Security Index cards do not contain a summary of substantive information concerning subjects. There are more than 15,000 persons contained in the Security Index. Some of the more complicated cases already have summary reports prepared. On a percentage basis, the number of Security Index subjects contained in summary reports is virtually negligible.

After Security Index subjects are arrested it is the plan of the Department that the facts will be presented to any Administrative Board by the U. S. Attorney. U. S. Attorneys do not now receive copies of Bureau reports on Security Index subjects. Thus, the Bureau will be faced with the proposition of furnishing thousands of reports to U. S. Attorneys in such fashion that they may compile a summarization of pertinent data for presentation to a Hearing Board for a determination as to the subject's continued detention.

The Executives Conference was of the opinion that nothing should be done to appreciably slow down the present rate of production in the Field and the addition of names to the Security Index.

JOINT COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS:

The Joint Committee considered the above on 6/30/51, and felt that it would require a staggering amount of work to prepare the summaries at this time; that it would be uneconomical to do this because in many instances such summary reports would not be needed, and a provision has already been made for the preparation of summary reports where necessary later; and in view of the large volume of work which Field Offices are confronted with at the present time, the Joint Committee unanimously felt the preparation of summary reports at this time would not be justified. Of course, if any specific reason exists why a summary report is necessary in an individual case, such report will be prepared and this is now being done.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

The Executives Conference of 7-9-51, consisting of Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_, recommended unanimously that there be no change in the current procedure. \_\_\_\_\_ reluctantly agreed. The Conference felt that efforts should be concentrated on investigation and preparing individuals for inclusion in the Security Index and the preparation of summary reports in those specific instances where a definite need immediately arises. The ultimate hope is, as expressed by \_\_\_\_\_, to clear up investigative delinquencies, get current investigative reports in file in all security cases and then recommend the preparation of summary reports.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference .

I disagree. This project should be started now. It can be done on a selected ~~staggered~~ basis until it is entirely completed.

d.



ALL SUPERVISORS ON SECURITY INDEX DESK

July 23, 1951

TRANSFERS OF KEY FIGURES AND  
TOP FUNCTIONARIES BETWEEN  
FIELD DIVISIONS

Your attention is called to attached SAC Letter Number 72, Part A of which concerns the work being handled on your desks.

Henceforth, when a Key Figure or Top Functionary is transferred from one division to another by Form FD-128 that individual shall be considered as a Key Figure or Top Functionary (as the case may be) by the new office of origin.

Effective immediately, when Forms FD-128 are received at the Bureau they shall be submitted to the Statistical Section for appropriate changes to be made on the Security Index Cards. When they are received from the Statistical Section they will be routed to the supervisor handling the old office of origin. The supervisor will attach the Key Figure Card for the old office of origin to the Form FD-128 and route both to the supervisor of the new office of origin. That supervisor shall prepare a Key Figure Card for his division from the information appearing on the Key Figure Card for the old office of origin and place same in his Key Figure box. The supervisor of the new office of origin will then initial the Form FD-128. It will be the responsibility of the supervisor of the new office of origin to follow that office to see that investigation is conducted within six months in the cases of Key Figures or within three months in the cases of Top Functionaries in keeping with the instructions set forth in the SAC Letter.

(In summation, our present policy concerning interviews with subjects of security cases is as follows. It is noted that in all cases prior Bureau authority is required.

1. Subjects may not be removed from the Security Index without being interviewed unless a good reason exists to the contrary.)

Pg 2

Pg 2

(The Security Division felt that it is necessary and desirable to liberalize our policy of interviews along the above lines because:

2. The pending case load of Communist cases has sharply increased.

3. We are further increasing the pending case load by requiring the field to open cases on Communist Party members as far back as January 1, 1949 (as required by the McCarran Act).

4. Additional interviews will enable us to more rapidly close these pending cases through arriving at a decision as to the potential dangerousness of the subject and whether he should be placed on the Security Index.)

(Typed July 30, 1951)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
NO NUMBER

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: INTERVIEWS WITH SUBJECTS OF  
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

Dear Sir:

Effective upon receipt of this letter the following instructions with respect to obtaining prior Bureau authority before interviewing subjects of security investigations shall be adhered to.

1. Security Index Subjects:

As in the past, prior Bureau authority shall be obtained by you before conducting pretext or direct interviews of subjects who are included in your Security Index unless they fall in category 4 below. However, once you have been authorized to contact such subjects under pretext, and if upon such contacts they have indicated a cooperative attitude, you may interview them directly without obtaining further Bureau authority.

As in the past, individuals shall not be removed from the Security Index without being interviewed unless a good reason exists to the contrary.

Enc 1

Henceforth, prior Bureau authority must be obtained before an initial direct or pretext approach may be made to subjects in this category. However, once Bureau authority for initial contact has been obtained it will not be necessary to obtain further Bureau authority for direct interview with such subjects if your initial interview indicates same to be desirable.

3. Subjects Who Have Been Investigated And Against Whom No Current Membership Or Activity In Communist Or Related Matters Have Been Developed:

This group includes subjects of current investigation who are not in the Security Index and investigation has not produced information of sufficient quality or quantity to enable you to decisively recommend the inclusion or elimination of the subjects from the Security Index. If, after a thorough investigation, the information developed leaves doubt as to whether the subject should be eliminated or included in the Security Index, that subject should be interviewed unless some reason exists to the contrary.

Henceforth, it will not be necessary in such cases to obtain prior bureau authority. These subjects may be interviewed by Agents of your office upon your specific authority in each instance.

ENC 2

- (4) In those cases where the investigation fails to definitely reflect whether the subject is a potential threat to the internal security, interviews will enable us to decisively determine such information and to decide whether such subjects should be included in the Security Index.

ENC 3



May 21, 1951

## CASE ADMINISTRATION

## Security Index - GENERAL

There is attached a copy of a memorandum of the Executives' Conference originally submitted to the Director under date of April 17, 1951.

An exhaustive search made throughout the Bureau over an extended period of time has failed to locate the original of this memorandum. Therefore, it is being resubmitted in this manner at this time since it cannot be established definitely whether the contents have been brought to the attention of the Director.

THE DIRECTOR

April 17, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

CASE ADMINISTRATION

On April 16, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

considered the question of uniformly handling the status of Security Index cases on individuals who have been placed on the Security Index. This question was considered by the Internal Security - Espionage Conference on April 2-3, 1951.

Internal Security-Espionage Conference Suggestion:

The conference pointed out that some offices at the present time are reopening individual Security Index cases for the purpose of verifying the addresses of the subjects. Following the verification of the addresses (Business and residence), the case is then closed. In other offices, the addresses are verified without reopening the case. There is a lack of uniformity in this procedure, and the conference felt that uniformity was desirable throughout the field in order to properly reflect the volume of work being handled by the Bureau. The conference recommended that the uniform procedure be followed by maintaining all Security Index cases in a pending inactive status in order that the cases could be assigned to Agents and followed on the basis of a pending inactive case. It was felt this would permit a closer supervision in the handling of these cases and reflect the true condition of pending work in the field offices.

The New York Office was of the opinion that this would be an unnecessary administrative procedure. That office currently follows the policy of checking the addresses of Security Index subjects by assignment of the case to an Agent without reopening the case and without maintaining the case in a pending inactive status. The New York office felt this was the simplest procedure and would eliminate the maintenance of assignment cards and the administrative detail of opening and closing cases. The New York Office follows the verification of these addresses by means of an administrative tickler. The New York Office further felt that it would be misleading to show as pending in the various field offices a large number of cases opened solely for the purpose of verifying addresses.

The Detroit, Newark, Seattle and Boston Offices were in agreement with the New York Office.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference felt that there should be uniformity throughout the field in the handling of these cases. The Executives'

ENC 1



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Conference unanimously recommended against the opening and closing of the Security Index cases each six months for the purpose of checking the addresses of the subjects. It was felt that this furnished a padded picture of the work in the field and did not accurately reflect the number of matters handled by the field. It was pointed out that in many instances, these addresses can be verified telephonically. It was felt that an unnecessary administrative burden was also placed on the field by the opening and closing of these 15,000 plus cases each six months.

The Executives' Conference split on the question of whether these cases should be handled through administrative tickler or through maintaining them in a pending inactive status.

Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_ were of the opinion that a system now followed by the New York Office is correct and the verifying of the addresses in these cases each six months should be accomplished by the use of administrative ticklers. They felt that this was the simplest procedure and yet allowed the proper follow-up in the handling of the cases. They felt that any other system which would keep these cases in a pending inactive status would show an untrue picture of the actual pending work in the field offices. They recommended that the method of handling these cases again be re-examined on January 1, 1952.

The remainder of the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_ were of the opinion that these cases should be maintained in a pending inactive status. They felt that by this procedure the cases could be followed closely in the field and there would be a responsibility on the Agent to whom the case was assigned to properly channel all information concerning the subject into the appropriate file. They felt further that there is considerable efforts expended in the verification of the addresses of these subjects each six months, particularly in the metropolitan areas where most of the subjects reside. While many of the addresses can be verified telephonically, in a great many instances in the metropolitan areas it is necessary to perform considerable investigation due to the movement of the Security Index subjects, both as to residences and employment. They felt that these cases should be kept pending inactive as they do involve work and the field should receive credit for them as pending matters which require attention at periodic intervals.

The field will be instructed in accordance with your approval in the over-all SAC Letter being prepared concerning the recommendations of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

ENC  
- 2 -



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: August 17, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 70 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 62 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,660.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: August 1, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

PURPOSE

To advise you concerning the status of the delinquency in the field in security matters.

DETAILS

Under (C) in SAC Letter Number 30 dated March 31, 1951, the field was advised of the serious delinquency in security matters and was instructed to review the conditions in each office and place into effect a program designed to reduce the delinquency in security-type cases. The details of the programs instituted to accomplish the reduction have been submitted to the Bureau.

Various programs were instituted which generally fall into the following items depending on the conditions in each particular office.

1. Many offices assigned additional personnel to security work. The largest reassignments were in the Baltimore, Newark and San Francisco offices where 20, 16 and 15 additional Agents were placed on security work.
2. Additional security work was assigned to Police agencies.
3. The Newark, Los Angeles and New York offices furthered the use of correlating units to expedite file searches and report writing.
4. Newark and Detroit are using a special group of experienced Agents as report writers to speed up the preparation of reports.
5. The Atlanta office placed a ten-day deadline on security work.
6. Training classes have been set up in several offices to speed up the training of new personnel assigned to security work thus expediting the proper preparation of reports and the program.

7. The Honolulu office has a system of checking all delinquent cases on the 15th of each month, calling the delinquency to the attention of the Agent to whom the delinquent case is assigned and then following up on the case four days before the end of the month.

Although there has not been sufficient time elapsed to fully evaluate the results of the various programs instituted in the field as a result of SAC Letter Number 30, the following figures are set out to show the trend in delinquency status to date.

PERCENTAGE DELINQUENCY and CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Feb 1, 1951</u>	<u>April 1, 1951</u>	<u>July 1, 1951</u>
Albany	45.8	46.3	43.0
Albuquerque	14.9	24.3	15.0
Anchorage	18.0	00.0	00.0
Atlanta	15.3	14.1	12.8
Baltimore	73.0	63.9	37.7
Birmingham	55.4	50.5	29.1
Boston	56.2	55.6	51.1
Buffalo	50.8	51.7	44.0
Butte	52.4	47.1	54.7
Charlotte	39.8	28.5	26.6
Chicago	50.1	63.7	52.3
Cincinnati	42.9	44.7	51.7
Cleveland	67.1	64.1	65.3
Dallas	26.4	24.4	32.6
Denver	5.2	34.3	46.1
Detroit	58.4	67.1	64.9
El Paso	27.3	23.0	32.0
Honolulu	30.3	19.1	18.4
Houston	16.6	21.6	34.0
Indianapolis	46.5	58.5	59.5
Kansas City	15.5	44.9	43.0
Knoxville	28.9	22.1	30.8
Little Rock	41.3	2.9	56.3
Los Angeles	56.6	62.8	61.8
Louisville	25.0	43.9	30.7
Memphis	2.6	00.0	1.2
Miami	47.7	29.7	44.7
Milwaukee	56.0	59.1	60.8



	<u>Feb. 1, 1951</u>	<u>April 1, 1951</u>	<u>July 1, 1951</u>
Minneapolis	60.3	57.8	59.1
Mobile	21.9	29.9	10.9
Newark	62.9	61.7	63.2
New Haven	24.1	19.6	22.2
New Orleans	28.5	24.6	14.5
New York	66.3	68.0	75.0
Norfolk	36.4	50.8	24.6
Oklahoma City	55.8	37.3	43.4
Omaha	62.1	62.7	54.9
Philadelphia	50.0	42.4	62.8
Phoenix	18.8	25.8	30.6
Pittsburgh	50.9	47.9	51.8
Portland	30.3	33.2	43.8
Richmond	68.0	40.3	44.3
St. Louis	24.9	22.5	18.8
Salt Lake City	.0	20.0	27.8
San Antonio	53.4	51.3	55.0
San Diego	53.5	59.7	41.4
San Francisco	58.8	47.6	53.3
San Juan	25.5	59.7	55.6
Savannah	41.0	31.5	27.5
Seattle	73.2	72.9	56.6
Springfield	.9	2.2	40.6
Washington Field	36.8	37.6	23.1

DELINQUENCY BREAKDOWN ALL FIELD OFFICES  
and CLASSIFICATIONS

	<u>Pending</u> <u>Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent</u> <u>Matters</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Delinquent</u>
Feb. 1, 1951	29,761	15,895	53.6
April 1, 1951	30,857	16,873	54.7
July 1, 1951	33,264	18,688	56.2

ACTION

This is for your information. This matter will be followed on September 1, 1951, in line with the Executives' Conference recommendation to reevaluate the work in the field to consider instructing the field to write current investigative reports.

The matter of delinquency in security investigations will be taken up at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference in September. At that time various methods for reducing the delinquency shall be discussed and any suggestions made will be considered in an effort to arrive at a solution to this problem.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM : JOINT COMMITTEE

DATE: 8/6/51

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #818  
EMPLOYEE: SAN DIEGO OFFICE  
REVISION OF FORM FD-186

MEMBERS PRESENT: Messrs.

SUGGESTION:

That Form FD-186 (memorandum form used to list data to be posted on the reverse side of Security Index cards) be amended to include: Position in Party; Source and Date; Evaluation.

It was the aim of the suggesting employee to adjust Form FD-186 so that it would be applicable just as much to the Communist Index card preparation as to Security Index card preparation.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

7  
 , Chief of the Internal Security Section, appeared personally before the Joint Committee on 7/31/51 and the Committee took advantage of his explanation in consideration of the suggestion. It appeared that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.

explained that Position in the Party, Source and Date, and Evaluation, have no connection with the Security Index card. Further, there is no connection between the Security Index card and the Communist Index card. Communist Index cards have been prepared since the early Spring of 1948 and no form has been prepared; further, there has been no expressed need for a form for the preparation of Communist Index cards. It is desirable to keep the two programs separate.

No benefits would be derived from including the suggested data on Form FD-186. Therefore, the Joint Committee, taking cognizance of the above facts, recommended that the proposed revision not be made in Form FD-186.

775  
changed  
to

62-6

Office Memorandum • UNIT

GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Albuquerque

DATE: August 23, 1951

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter #73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951, Section A, requesting that each office advise the Bureau when the instructions set out therein had been complied with.

Please be advised that all Security cases in the Albuquerque Division have been reviewed in this connection and no cases have been opened as a result of this review.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8-14-51

FROM : SAC, Memphis

CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Reference SAC letter, No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

No new security investigations have been opened in the Memphis Division as a result of the instructions of this SAC letter.

As the Bureau is aware, Communist activity in the Memphis Division is relatively small. There is a small group of Communists in the city of Memphis and we have seventeen Security Index subjects in the city of Memphis, there being twenty-one Security Index subjects in the entire Memphis Division. Memphis has never had an informant in the Party. We have been constantly aware of the desirability of developing an informant in the Party, and our efforts are continuing in this regard. This has been difficult since the small group of Communists in Memphis are relatively inactive, have no Party headquarters, or meeting place, and is not known to hold regular meetings.

In the absence of an informant in the Party who would be able to furnish reliable information as to membership and activities, and in an effort to keep abreast of the activities of known Communist Party members as well as to become cognizant of any new Communist Party members or sympathizers, it has been the practice of the Memphis Division to investigate thoroughly all cases wherein Communist Party membership, affiliation, or sympathizers, or subversive activity of any nature is alleged.

It is believed that all individuals known to the Memphis Division who could be potentially classified as Security Index subjects in keeping with referenced SAC letter have already been so classified.

We shall remain on the alert for any information concerning persons who should be considered for inclusion in the Security Index.

changed  
to  
28-8



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 10, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX ~~GENERAL~~

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.


DETAILS

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on July 13, 1951:

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
July 14-20	58	8	50
July 21-27	57	8	49
July 28-August 3	92	16	76
August 3-10	64	13	51
Totals	271	45	226

|| The Security Index count as of today is 16,598.

For your information, during the preceding month ending July 13, 1951, 476 new cards were added, 45 cards were cancelled, or a net increase during that period of 431 cards.



April 17, 1951

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

INTERNAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT  
EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS

On April 16, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

, considered the suggestion of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference held April 2-3, 1951, that instructions be reiterated to the field stressing the need for the principal office in Loyalty of Government Employee investigations to follow up from a security angle on any cases where subversive derogatory information is developed.

Internal Security-Espionage  
Conference suggestion:

The conference discussed the problem of correlating Loyalty of Government Employee investigations with the requirements of the Security Index where substantial derogatory information is developed. It was pointed out that because the Loyalty of Government Employee Program and the Security Index Program are worked separately in many instances in the field and at the Seat of Government, we must make sure that subjects of LGE investigations are considered for the Security Index. The conference came to the conclusion that the present instructions cover this situation in that auxiliary offices, when derogatory information is developed, have been instructed to forward copies of reports to the principal office covering the subject's employment. This procedure enables the principal office to recommend continuation of the case as a security matter and possible inclusion in the Security Index. The conference was of the opinion that a Bulletin to the field, reiterating these instructions and calling the problem to the attention of all Agents would be helpful in correcting this situation.

The conference also suggested the Bureau call to the attention of the field the responsibility for submitted supplemental loyalty reports in those instances where additional derogatory information is developed in connection with a completed loyalty case. It was pointed out that the Bureau has a continuing responsibility to advise the Civil Service Commission and the employing agency of developments in closed loyalty cases when derogatory information is received.

The Conference recommended that this Bulletin also stress the fact that during the course of LGE investigations information developed indicating an individual may be a potential saboteur should be furnished to the Bureau by teletype at once so that the data can be disseminated immediately to the interested Intelligence Agencies of the Armed Forces and other interested agencies.

4-17-51

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The conference also was of the opinion that it would be desirable in this same Bulletin to call to the attention of all Agents the necessity of immediately opening cases and considering for inclusion in the Security Index any individual concerning whom information is received during another investigation which would indicate he is a possible risk in a vital facility. It was pointed out that there may be corollary investigation, such as interviews in connection with espionage cases and related matters, wherein derogatory information is developed concerning individuals employed in vital facilities. In such instances the investigating Agent should immediately refer the matter for consideration under the Security Index program.

This Bulletin likewise should stress the absolute necessity for advising the local branches of the Armed Services' Intelligence Agencies in all instances of unfavorable information developed concerning individuals employed in vital facilities.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation

The Executives' Conference unanimously agreed that the overall SAC Letter covering the results of the Internal Security - Espionage Conference should cover the above suggestions. In the event you approve, this will be done.

Respectfully  
For the Conference

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "OK.H."

April 20, 1951

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS LOS ANGELES DIVISIONINTERNAL - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you concerning the study made by the Security Division relative to : (1) Administrative handling of cases involving Security Index subjects and (2)

BACKGROUNDRecent Los Angeles Inspection

1. Administrative Handling of Cases Involving Security Index subjects.

During the recent inspection of the Los Angeles Office, suggested an administrative procedure for handling verifications of residence and employment addresses as follows:

(1) (1) To give the Bureau credit for continuous effort in following the cases of Security Index subjects, which effort would be reflected in the statistical accomplishments going to the Congressional committees, and (2) to reduce the clerical time and effort now necessary in the opening and closing of cases merely for the purpose of verifying a residence and employment address. In many instances these verifications may be made by a telephone call, and the time necessary to do that is far less than the clerical time consumed in administrative handling of the matter.

In order to accomplish the suggestions set forth above, recommended that Security Index cases be maintained in a pending inactive status and assigned to an Agent.

778  
changed  
to  
8-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 21, 1951

WB FROM : SAC, Charlotte

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.  
For the information of the Bureau, the files of the Charlotte  
Division have been reviewed in accordance with instructions set  
forth in referenced SAC letter.

As a result of the above mentioned review, there have  
been nineteen (19) cases opened pursuant to the Bureau's instruc-  
tions. It is noted that there are several pending cases falling  
within the category described in referenced SAC letter on which  
Security Index Cards have not been requested. It is contemplated  
that requests will be submitted to the Bureau in these instances  
in the near future.



*list*

779

Mr. Peyton Ford  
Deputy Attorney General  
Director, FBI

August 29, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of individuals maintained in the Security Index. This list is subdivided alphabetically under the field offices of this Bureau covering the residence of the individuals listed.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

*8-30-51  
New list delivered  
personally to  
Col. W.W. Ingram  
at J. Edgar Hoover  
Secured & dtg 10/1/51  
Ple*

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Special Section-Espionage not  
furnished to Department

*B*

RECORDED - 107


SEP 1 1951

Review for possible

*SEP 1 1951  
SECURITY INDEX  
Ple*

*W.W. Ingram  
Ple*

AUG 29 1951



780  
changed  
to

61-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, MOBILE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS--  
○ SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC letter number 73, dated July 24, 1951,

Subsection A.

This is to advise that a review of the files requested therein has been completed in the Mobile Office and a total of three cases has been opened pursuant to instructions contained therein.

THE DIRECTOR

August 15, 1951

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
AM. COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAWAII  
HONOLULU DIVISION  
DISTRICT #13  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

PURPOSE

To furnish a breakdown of the 104 Security Index - <sup>65</sup> card subjects in the Honolulu Office.

DETAILS

In the memorandum from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ dated August 3, 1951, captioned as above and attached, an explanation is set out regarding the difference between the number of security index card subjects in the Honolulu Division, 104, and the stated membership of the Communist Party in the Territory of Hawaii of 36. To the explanation you commented "I want breakdown of the 104."

You will recall that the figure 36 was taken from a statement made by \_\_\_\_\_ of the Communist Party of Hawaii, in the latter part of December, 1950, at the Communist Party Convention in San Francisco, and that former members of the Communist Party of Hawaii over the past several years have estimated the Party membership in Hawaii at between 100 and 160.

A review of the 104 Security Index card cases, referred to above, reflects the following breakdown in regard to past or present membership and/or activity in behalf of the Communist Party as well as an analysis of the reasons for considering the individuals dangerous or potentially dangerous in the event of an emergency.



1.	Cases reflecting current membership and/or activity in behalf of CP.	3
2.	Cases reflecting evidence of past CP membership and/or activity in behalf of CP; plus	
	(A) Employment in strategic industry.	28
	(B) Training, experience and/or leadership in CP.	41
	(C) Military training.	3
	(D) Current activity in CP Front Groups.	16
	(E) Experience as couriers or mail drops for CP.	2
		<hr/> 90
3.	Cases in which there is no evidence of CP membership, past or present, but in which there is activity since the Korean situation in behalf of CP fronts or in espousing the line of the CP.	3
4.	Cases in which membership in the CP has never been established, yet in which the subjects, in the past, have been active and influential members of, or affiliated with, an organization or organizations dominated and infiltrated by the CP where the individual's activity or affiliation therein has been indicative of substantial adherence to the objectives of the CP.	<hr/> 8 104

You will note that of the 104 cases on the Security Index, past or present membership, and/or activity in behalf of the Communist Party, can be established in 93 cases. There is documentary evidence of CP membership in only a very few cases and in most instances the membership and/or participation in the activities of the CP is established by information furnished by former members of the Party. In each of the 3

cases falling under category number 1, the subject has admitted CP membership within recent months.

From information available, it is not possible to identify by name the 36 Party members referred to by . . . . . The absence of evidence of current subversive activity is not considered sufficient to warrant the cancellation of the Security Index cards unless there is some positive development justifying cancellation. In many instances, individuals have gone underground or divorced themselves from open participation in Party activities because of instructions issued by the Communist Party. This is particularly true in Hawaii where the Party is functioning underground. The result is that there are more persons considered dangerous and potentially dangerous to the internal security according to our standards and maintained on the Security Index than the number 36 given by . . . . . in a self-serving statement at the Party convention in San Francisco. In the interest of security, it is believed we are fully justified in maintaining all names in the Security Index which meet or have met our Security Index standards in the absence of positive evidence that the individuals have become disaffected or disassociated from the CP.

ACTION

None. The foregoing is an answer to your request.

August 3, 1951

Mr. [REDACTED]

Mr. [REDACTED]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
 AKA COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAWAII  
 HONOLULU DIVISION  
 DISTRICT NO. 13  
 INTERNAL SECURITY - C

PURPOSE

To clarify for the Director the difference between the number of Security Index card subjects in the Honolulu Division of 104 and the stated number of members of the Communist Party in that Division as of December, 1950, which was 36. This information is set forth in my memorandum to you of July 26, 1951, which is attached.

BACKGROUND

This difference is due to the fact that our Security Index contains not only those individuals who are current members of the Communist Party but also many individuals who have at some time in the past been reported as Communist Party members who; (1) are engaged in strategic employment; (2) are individuals having Reserve status in the Armed Forces; (3) have received training in the Armed Forces; (4) are Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; (5) or who have made statements of a violent revolutionary nature displaying sympathies which make them a threat to the security of the country. Individuals are also included in our Security Index against whom we have not developed evidence of actual Communist Party membership but who have in the past been active in Communist front groups and who have continued such activity since the advent of the Korean war, thereby displaying their continued adherence to the principals of the Communist movement. DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "I want breakdown of the 104. H." (I want breakdown of the 104) H.

Individuals falling in the above categories constitute the difference between the above-stated figures.

ENCLOSURE I desire to point out that the number of individuals in the Security Index has no direct relationship to the number of individuals who are current Communist Party members inasmuch as in our investigation we are constantly ferreting out those persons who by reason of past activity as well as current activity should be considered for apprehension in the event of an emergency. DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "This sounds like just words to me. H."

Attachment [REDACTED]

(This sounds like  
 just words to me)

ENC 1 H.

ENCLOSURE [REDACTED]

NOT RECORDED  
 145 AUG 31 1951

As you know, on August 1, 1951, we directed a letter to the Honolulu Division, pointing out the Bureau's observations with regard to current activity in the Communist movement in Hawaii. We instructed them to immediately undertake a program of developing additional confidential informants capable of penetrating the underground operations of the Communist Party of Hawaii and to keep the Bureau advised of what steps that office is taking in order to provide additional coverage of the Communist Party of Hawaii. In that letter the absolute necessity of keeping abreast of the maritime situation in Hawaii was pointed out to Honolulu. They were instructed to establish and maintain necessary sources which would enable them to be advised on a daily basis as to any new developments pertaining to the contemplated strike in the maritime industry.

ACTION

None. Submitted for informational purposes.

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "I want to know why [redacted] and [redacted] just awoke to the Hawaiian situation. It having been site of "Pearl Harbor" fiasco I can't understand our indifference to our responsibilities there up to now. Why? H."

(I want to know why [redacted] and [redacted] just awoke to the Hawaiian situation. It having been the site of "Pearl Harbor" fiasco I can't understand our indifference to our responsibilities there up to now. Why? H.)

7-26-51

Security Index Subjects

As of June 16, 1951, 104 individuals in the Territory of Hawaii were on the Security Index, 35 of whom are classified as Key figures.

(This isn't clear. It says 36 members in C.P. who are ballance of 104? ) H.

(I want ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ to make sure we are really on top of this situation in Hawaii and not have another fiasco as in Porto Rico as result of "sleazy Hollow" by Security Div.) H.

- 8 -

ENC 10

781  
changed  
to

7-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, BUTTE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

RE: SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

The files of this office have been reviewed in accordance with instructions contained in referenced letter.

As a result of this review, seven cases have been reopened with the view of including the subjects on the Security Index.

782 changed  
to  
40-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 29, 1951

FROM : SAC, Portland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951.

In August 1950 a complete review of Portland security files was conducted and cases opened for current investigation. Since that date cases falling within the purview of referenced SAC letter have received current investigation and consideration for security index.

The review requested in referenced SAC letter has now been completed and in view of the Portland policy referred to above, only one new case was required to be opened pursuant to your instructions. Investigation of this case and of all others leading to consideration for security index will be expedited.



783  
changed  
to  
24-8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, KNOXVILLE  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
O SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

DATE: August 31, 1951

2/1

Re SAC letter #75, 7/24/51.

Pursuant to instructions of reflet the Knoxville Office has surveyed its files which are pertinent to this matter. All individual security cases opened by this office since January 1, 1949 have been reviewed. All Espionage cases or Atomic Energy Act cases opened since that date have also been reviewed. The file has been reviewed from that date forward.

The Communist Index of this office has also been reviewed and no person coming within the limits of this letter was noted. In connection with this, the Knoxville Office is in a continuous process of including in the Communist Index those Atomic Energy Act-Applicant cases wherein sufficient derogatory information was developed on the applicant to warrant his inclusion in the index. Each such case is considered for possible recommendation to the Bureau for inclusion in the Security Index. When such cases arise they will be referred promptly to the Bureau.

In view of the above, no cases have been opened by the Knoxville Office in connection with this matter.





784  
changed  
to  
12-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Dallas

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated 7-21-51

The file reviews requested in referenced letter have been completed in the Dallas office. Thirty-six cases were opened or re-opened as a result of this survey.

785 changed  
to  
4-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 17, 1951

FROM : SAC, BIRMINGHAM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

Referenced SAC Letter suggested that each office (1) review all individual security cases which have been opened since January 1, 1949; (2) review files from January 1, 1949, to date and (3) check Communist index for names of persons reported as members of Marxist and revolutionary organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949.

This has been done in this office.

The total number of cases which has been opened in this office with regard to the above, totals 16. One case was opened after a review of the file. One case maintained in the closed section revealing Communist Party membership of an individual as late as 1950, was re-opened.

With regard to the Communist index, it is pointed out to the Bureau that this office made a review of the cards in this index which totals 143 in this office on May 23, 1951, and at that time opened 14 new cases as a result of information contained on these Communist index cards. This action was in accordance with that set forth in referenced SAC Letter; however, it was done in May 1951, and current pending security cases are now being investigated with regard to those subjects on whom these 16 cases were opened. As the subjects of these cases are investigated, they will be considered for inclusion in the security index and the Bureau appropriately advised in each individual case.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: August 31, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 38 new cards were added to the Security Index and 6 cards were canceled, a net increase of 32 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,751.

787 changed  
to  
11-19

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 30, 1951

FROM : SAC, Cleveland

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
O SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter #73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

This is to advise that the review of files in the Cleveland Division including file pursuant to referenced SAC letter has been completed. A total of twelve files were opened or reopened on the basis of membership since January 1, 1949, in CP or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations. Other files containing evidence of such membership were already in a pending status or the subjects thereof had already been placed on the Security Index list.



788 changed  
to  
46-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, San Diego

DATE: 8-20-51

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re Section (A), SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

In accordance with instructions set forth in referenced SAC Letter, this office undertook a review of all individual Security case files opened since January 1, 1949, all material placed in file since that date, and checked its Communist Index. This project has now been completed.

As a result of this review, the San Diego Division has reopened 140 closed files and has opened 48 files on the basis of material previously maintained in the file, making a total of 188 cases.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: August 24, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS:

During the past week, 67 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 59 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,719.



790 changed  
to  
5-17

WASHINGTON 13 FROM BOSTON 23 3-26PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

REFERENCE SAC LETTER SEVENTY, SERIES NINETEEN HUNDRED FIFTY ONE, DATED JULY EIGHTEEN, FIFTYONE. REBUTEL AUGUST TWENTYTWO, LAST. BACKGROUND MEMORANDA AND PHOTOS SUBMITTED WITH BOSTON LETTER AUGUST TWENTYONE, LAST. PHOTOS ARE PRESS PHOTOS BUT OF RECENT ORIGIN AND REPRESENT BEST LIKENESSES OF SUBJECTS. BOSTON LETTER SET FORTH OUTLINE WHEREBY THIS MATERIAL MIGHT BE OBTAINED FOR USE BY BUREAU. ADDITIONAL INQUIRY BEING PRESENTLY CONDUCTED TO OBTAIN PHOTOS TO ACT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ABOVE.



791 changed to  
1-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 7, 1951

*u/v* FROM : SAC, Albany

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS  
OF INDIVIDUALS-  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 73, Series, 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

This is to advise that the program outlined in referenced SAC Letter has been completed in this office and as a result 62 cases have been opened.



792  
changed  
to  
32-26

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS  
NEW HAVEN OFFICE

DATE: September 8, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 73 dated July 24, 1951, Paragraph A.

For the information of the Bureau, the New Haven Office has been reviewing all of its closed files, files, Communist Index, branch files of the Communist Party and other subversive organizations on a project basis since August, 1950.

Since August, 1950, approximately 85 to 100 new cases have been opened each month. Since the receipt of referenced SAC Letter approximately ~~one hundred~~ additional cases are being opened. The reviews requested in referenced SAC Letter have been completed by this office. It is estimated that since August, 1950 between 800 and 1000 cases have been reopened on the basis of this project.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 8-27-51

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS*GENERAL*

There is attached hereto a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of August 17, 1951.



794  
changed  
to  
24-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI,

DATE: 9/5/51

FROM : SAC, KNOXVILLE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

44  
9/11

Re SAC letter NO. 100, Serial C. 12/28/50.

Address and employment of all Security Index subjects of this office have been verified during the past six months. All cards are in an up-to-date status with two exceptions which are now in a pending status in connection with possible change of address of subject to another territory.

795

*list*

SAC, Omaha

August 29, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX -

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
REGISTERED MAIL  
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

ReBulet dated December 29, 1950.

There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.

The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.

Enclosure

*[Handwritten signature]*

*to*

RECORDED - 118

AUG 30 1951

795

view for possible

497355

AUG 30 1951

*[Handwritten initials/signature]*

*[Handwritten initials/signature]*

SEP 17 1951



796  
changed  
to  
52-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Springfield

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951, Subsection (A).

This is to advise that this Office has completed a review of the closed files in this Office, together with a review of the subjects of Communist Index cards and the file and related Security Matters, and as a result of this review, based on information contained in referenced SAC Letter, ten cases were opened for investigation to determine whether there was sufficient information concerning activities of these individuals subsequent to January 1, 1949, to place them on the Security Index list.

*changed to*  
9-20

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 10, 1951

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Chicago

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

*private*

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

In compliance with re SAC Letter, the files of this office have been reviewed for the purpose of opening cases on individuals not previously investigated, concerning whom information has been received alleging Communist Party membership on their part subsequent to January 1, 1949.

This review has been completed and has resulted in the opening of 120 cases.

RJB:OC

4101  
62 SEP 21 1951  
RECORDED 24 8  
EX - 67  
SEP 12 1951  
-9-20  
*R* *CH*



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: SEPTEMBER 13, 1951.

FROM: *W* ASAC, OMAHA

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *GENERAL*

ReBuLet August 29, 1951.

The new Security Index List is being maintained in accordance with Bureau instructions.

The old list has been destroyed by burning.



4M NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 7, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS:

During the past week 53 new cards were added to the Security Index and 5 cards were canceled, a net increase of 48 cards.

Security Index count as of today is 16,799.



4-3-51

April 3, 1951

## SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - LOS ANGELES DIVISION

Index - General

Attached hereto are four inspection memoranda prepared during the course of the recent inspection at Los Angeles by , captioned as follows:

Security Coverage  
Security Index and Communist Index  
Communist National Defense Informants  
Channelizing Memoranda - Security Matters

Your attention is particularly invited to the memorandum captioned Security Index and Communist Index wherein, on Page 3, a policy matter is considered concerning security index subject files.

Also, in the memorandum concerning Channelizing Memoranda - Security Matters, you will note that a simplified procedure is outlined in the handling of channelizing memoranda. The Inspector felt that this will be of definite assistance in Los Angeles due to the large volume of channelizing memoranda which, because of the volume, are becoming an administrative problem

SECURITY INDEX AND COMMUNIST INDEX

As of March 9, 1951, the Los Angeles Office had a total of 1769 cards in its Security Index. At this time, 376 of the Security Index Cards are tagged for Detcom and 89 are tagged Comsab. There are 78 key figures in the Los Angeles Division.

An examination was made of the cards maintained in the Security Index. There were no photographs on 771 of these cards, and on 340 cards there were inadequate descriptions. A sampling was made of the files of subjects on whom the office had neither photographs nor descriptions on their Security Index Cards. In 13 files examined for this purpose no photographs were maintained in the file which had not been placed on the Security Index Card. In the examination of the Security Index cards it was noted that the Los Angeles Office places both a description and photograph, where available, on the back of the Security Index Card maintained in the alphabetical section of the file. This procedure serves no useful purpose, and it is recommended that this practice be discontinued.

Heretofore, the office has been using as an administrative device a 3x5 tickler system which assisted in following both SI cards and the Detcom phase of the war plans. This system has been simplified and aside from the usual tickler for each SI card, handled by the SI Supervisor, the remainder of the administrative device has been simplified and is now being handled as part of the war plan administration as set forth in the separate memorandum on that matter.

Procedure for Verification of Residence and Employment

The procedure that has been used in the Los Angeles Office for verifying residence and employment of Security Index subjects has involved the use of the above-described 3x5 index cards. One of the Security Supervisors and a clerk have jointly been maintaining both the residence and employment addresses on these 3x5 cards in a current status so that they corresponded at all times with the residence and employment addresses maintained on the Security Index Cards.

INSPECTION REPORT  
LOS ANGELES OFFICE  
INSPECTOR  
MARCH 19, 1951

ENC 1

Form FD-154 used for verifications is made up from the 3x5 cards. The clerk fills in the name and file number of the subject whose residence and employment addresses are to be verified. In this condition the forms are routed across the Supervisor's desk, who then reopens and assigns the cases to be handled by the agents of the Security Squad. The agent is then required to check the Security Index Card itself and secure therefrom the last residence and employment addresses, which he enters on the top part of the form. He then conducts whatever investigation is necessary to verify and fill out the bottom half of the form. Form FD-154, fully executed, is then sent by routing slip to the Supervisor, who marks the case for closing administratively. Those cases requiring an FD-122 are next routed to the clerk, who prepares the FD-122 and makes the necessary corrections on the Security Index Card and on all of the 3x5 cards. The FD-122 then crosses the Supervisor's desk like any other outgoing mail. One-sixth of the Security Index Cards are handled each month in the above method.

Under the above-described procedure an agent initials the Form FD-154 when he has completed the verification and sends that form by routing slip to the appropriate Supervisor. In the ordinary process of handling mail the routing slips occasionally become detached, and the FD-154 goes into file with no action having been taken on it. In ten cases the Form FD-154 was found, fully executed, in the case file without the Bureau's having been advised. The procedure which permits this has been changed as reflected in the next paragraph.

During the course of the inspection the procedure outlined above has been changed. Only the administrative tickler is being used instead of the five sets of 3x5 cards previously used. The clerk who handles the Security Index pulls each day's administrative ticklers and makes up an FD-154 for the subject of each tickler. The entire top half of Form FD-154 is filled in by the clerk from information appearing on the Security Index Cards. These forms are then routed across the Supervisor's desk, who marks them to be reopened and assigned to the agents for verification. In the office block stamp appearing on the bottom of the form, the Supervisor indicates the agent to whom the matter is assigned and his own name. The form then goes through the Chief Clerk's Office for opening, assignment and serializing and is then routed to the appropriate agent for handling. When he has completed his work on it, he initials the copy, which is then routed back to the supervisor whose name appears in the block stamp. A work box is maintained on the Supervisor's desk for these forms. The Security Index clerk takes each day these forms on which it will be necessary to make up an FD-122, fills out the forms, and then routes them back to the Supervisor for initialing and closing of the file.

Those FD-154 forms which do not necessitate notification to the Bureau are merely initialed by the Supervisor and marked for closing. The tickler is then filed for the next six months period for verification again.

In the course of discussion of these procedures, SAC suggested an administrative procedure for handling verifications as outlined below. The objective he seeks is (1) to give the Bureau credit for continuous effort in following the cases of Security Index subjects, which effort would be reflected in the statistical accomplishments going to the Congressional committees, and (2) to reduce the clerical time and effort now necessary in the opening and closing of cases merely for the purpose of verifying a residence and employment address. In many instances these verifications may be made by a telephone call, and the time necessary to do that is far less than the clerical time consumed in the administrative handling of the matter.

idea is that cases which have resulted in the preparation of a Security Index Card and which from that date forward require no special handling save the verification of addresses should be placed in a pending inactive status and assigned to an agent. The tickler would be filed and would come up for review once each six months. The agent to whom those cases are assigned would be responsible on a continuous basis for keeping the Bureau advised of the current residence and employment of the subject. He would be followed on tickler by the Supervisor to insure that a Form FD-154 had been fully executed at least once each six months. This procedure eliminates much of the clerical effort required under the present practice and has the added advantage of continuous responsibility for knowing the whereabouts of Security Index subjects. With such fixed responsibility the agent to whom it is assigned would be encouraged to set up contacts with neighbors and employers with whom he could make verifications by telephone and who would keep him advised currently and immediately in the event of any changes on the part of the Security Index subject.

is submitting the above suggestion to the Bureau by separate communication. The inspector concurs in the suggestion made by him and believes that it has considerable merit and should be given serious consideration by the Bureau for adoption in all offices.

ENC 3

Communist Index

As of March 9, 1951, there were 9618 Communist Index cards maintained by the Los Angeles Office. These cards appeared to be maintained properly. A sample check was made of 100 Security Index Cards against the Communist Index. The Communist Index reflected corresponding cards in all but one instance.

The Inspector's suggestions relative to the handling of Form FD-154 have been noted and will be followed in the future.

The suggestion relative to the administrative procedure for handling verifications of residence and employments of SI subjects is being submitted to the Bureau by separate communication.

ENC 4

800  
changed  
to  
22-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9-12-51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

reference SAC Letter #73, series 1951, dated 7-24-51.

Instructions set forth in referenced letter complied with. Following a review of all individual security cases which have been opened in this office since January 1, 1949, two cases have been reopened for investigation to determine whether subjects of these cases should be included in this security index.

801  
changed  
to  
26-21

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED

GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 13, 1951

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC letter No. 73 (Section A), dated July 24, 1951.

In accordance with the instructions set forth, file review is currently in progress. It is noted that this review involves 9,368 security files established since January 1, 1949 and 72 sections of the file, as well as 13,900 Communist Index Cards.

Upon completion of this review the Bureau will be promptly advised concerning the number of cases opened.



802  
changed  
to  
45-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 15, 1951

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF  
INDIVIDUALS - SECURITY  
INDEX STANDARDS

Re Section A, SAC Letter 73 dated 7/24/51.

A thorough review has been made of all individual security cases opened since 1/1/49 and the file from 1/1/49 to date, and the Communist Index as well as other pertinent files in this office have been reviewed.

No cases have been opened as a result of the above review.

This office is currently opening cases immediately when information is received alleging membership in the Communist Party or other basic Marxist or revolutionary organizations.



803  
changed  
to  
49-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/13/51

FROM : SAC, Savannah

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Occurrence

Re SAC Letter No. 73, dated July 24, 1951.

This is to advise that all Individual Security cases opened since January 1, 1949, as well as the file from January 1, 1949 to date, the Communist Index cases as well as various Communist Infiltration Files and Communist Front Organization files, have been reviewed to determine whether there were any instances in which files should be re-opened or opened on individuals who have been active in the Communist Party since January 1, 1949.

As a result of this survey, no new cases have been opened in the Savannah Division.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 14, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on August 10, 1951:

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
August 11-17	70	8	62
August 18-24	67	8	59
August 25-31	38	6	32
September 1-7	53	5	48
September 8-14	82	3	79
<b>Totals</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>280</b>

The Security Index count as of today is 16,878.

For your information, during the preceding four-week period ending August 10, 1951, 271 new cards were added, 45 cards were cancelled, or a net increase during that period of 226 cards.

805 changed to  
39-21

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: September 19, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 26 dated 3-13-51, setting forth instructions regarding uniform handling of form FD-122.

According to referenced SAC Letter form FD-122 should set forth the contributors (agencies) as well as the appropriate code numbers in those cases where the subject is employed in a vital facility.

In many cases the agency designated as having primary security responsibility is also listed as a contributor and in this instance no problems are encountered in completing form FD-122. However, in many cases the agency having security responsibility at a vital facility is not listed as a contributor and in these instances some confusion exists as to the correct preparation of form FD-122. This problem is best illustrated by the following examples, taken from the Vital Facilities List furnished as an enclosure to SAC Letter No Number, 2-5-51.

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Title &amp; Location</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Code Contributor Responsible</u>
4755	West Penn Power System West Penn Power Co. Mitchell Station Courtney, Pa.	Steam electric 80,000 kw	
1945	U. S. Rubber Co. Institute, W. Va.	Buna synthetic rubber, Butadiene Styrene	

The Bureau is requested to advise what the proper designation of Nature of Industry would be in the above cases. In the case of 4755 for example would the correct designation be A-5; MB-5 or A; MB-5 or merely MB-5. In the case of 1945 would the correct designation be A; MB-13; AF-11 or MB-13; AF-11 or A-11-13; MB-13; AF-11?



805  
changed  
to  
39-21

SAC, Pittsburgh

October 5, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX -  
VITAL FACILITIES

Reurlet September 19, 1951, requesting Bureau advice as to the proper information to be included on the Form FD-122 in cases where subjects are employed in vital facilities.

As reflected in SAC Letter Number 26 dated March 13, 1951, the contributor or contributors should be listed by letters followed by the code number. The proper designation in the example submitted by you in connection with Item is . The correct designation for Item is .

As reflected in SAC Letter Number 26 dated March 13, 1951, the reports for subjects employed in vital facilities should contain a statement on the administrative page reflecting that the subject is employed in a vital facility and setting forth the name of the agency having security responsibility. It is not necessary to include the letter for the agency having the responsibility on the Form FD-122 except in those instances where the agency responsible also is listed as a contributor.

806  
changed to  
39-20

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR DATE: 9/18/51  
FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS --  
SECURITY INDEX CARDS

Re SAC Letter #73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

In accordance with instructions contained in referenced SAC Letter, a review was conducted of all individual security cases opened in this office since January 1, 1949, all serials in the file from January 1, 1949, and the Communist Index.

The project of reviewing this material has now been completed and, as a result, 97 cases have been opened by the Pittsburgh Office.

*File*



9-22-51

(B) SECURITY INDEX -- Preparation of Summary Reports Effective immediately you are to institute a project in your office of submitting summary reports on all individuals whose names are in your Security Index. In addition, you should submit summary reports at the time new names are recommended for the Security Index, providing the report submitted is not an initial report.

I realize that this will be a tremendous project for many offices and one which, of necessity because of the present heavy case load, must be handled on a selected and staggered basis until completed. However, eventually all Security Index cases will be brought up to date by a summary report and thereafter, each Security Index case will be followed on an annual basis as more fully described hereinafter. By this means we will be better prepared for the eventuality that the Emergency Detention Program may be placed in operation and the Bureau confronted with the immediate problem of furnishing usable reports on Security Index subjects to United States Attorneys.

In placing this program in operation, you should be guided by the following general instructions:

- 1.. Each office should follow the priority schedule set out below and complete the project of preparing summary reports in all Security Index cases as rapidly as possible. This should be a continuing project until completed.

9-22-51  
SAC LETTER NO. 95  
Series 1951

2. Prosecutive summaries in cases being considered under the Smith Act will suffice for this project and as long as prosecution is being considered you should be guided in those cases by instructions relating directly to Smith Act prosecutions.
3. If a summary report has been submitted within the last six months a summary report need not be prepared at this time, but you should prepare an administrative tickler to follow such cases in order that a summary report will be prepared in each case one year from the date of the last summary report and each year thereafter as indicated below. This does not change existing instructions in any case or class of cases in which you have been requested to submit summary reports more frequently.
4. Instructions contained herein should not be construed to prohibit the preparation of a summary report at any time or in any case when you deem a summary report necessary and warranted for any reason.
5. In cases in which a prior summary report has been submitted, summary reports being prepared should cover the period from the last summary report to date.

Schedule for Submitting Summary Reports

This matter must be pursued vigorously in each office. Of course, the time of completion of the project will vary in each office depending on the manner in which the project is administered, the present work load in the office and the personnel available. In order that Security Index cases can be brought up to date and summary reports prepared, you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the scheduling of the writing of summary reports:

1. Effective immediately a summary report should be prepared and forwarded to the Bureau stapled to a Form FD-122 in each instance when a new name is being recommended for inclusion in the Security Index. Of course, this instruction does not apply when the report submitted is an initial report in the case.
2. Effective immediately, you should schedule summary reports for preparation on each subject maintained in the Special Section of the Security Index when a summary report has not been submitted within the last six months. A summary report should be prepared in each case added to the Special Section if a summary report has not been submitted in the past six months.





This instruction does not change any existing instruction requiring summary reports to be submitted more frequently in Special Section cases.

3. The next regularly scheduled report to be prepared in each case wherein the subject is designated a Top Functionary should be a summary report bringing the case up to date from the last summary report submitted. In the future, a summary report should be prepared and forwarded to the Bureau along with your recommendation that a Security Index subject be designated a Top Functionary provided a current summary report has not already been submitted. Thereafter, a summary report should be submitted on a yearly basis on each Top Functionary.
4. The next regularly scheduled report to be prepared in each case in which the subject has been designated a Key Figure should be a summary report. In the future, a summary report should be prepared and furnished to the Bureau at the time each new Key Figure is designated. Thereafter, a summary report should be submitted on a yearly basis on each Key Figure.
5. The next regularly scheduled six months' report to be prepared in each case in which the subject is employed in a vital facility should be a summary report.
6. All remaining Security Index cases not falling under categories 1 to 5 inclusive should be reviewed and those cases scheduled for the preparation of summary reports when the review indicates no pertinent derogatory information has been submitted in report form since January 1, 1949.
7. The remainder of cases on the Security Index should be scheduled next for the preparation of summary reports.

Form and Content

Each summary report should bring the investigation up to date and its preparation should afford your office an excellent opportunity for complete review as to the content and thoroughness of the investigation. At the time each case is reviewed for the preparation of the summary report, the Agent to whom the case is assigned should be alert to set out leads, where warranted, to develop the case more fully. All pertinent information contained in your files which has not been included in report form should be set out in the summary report.

Each summary report should be suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau and should reflect all information having any pertinency as to whether or not there is justification for a Security

9-22-51  
SAC LETTER NO. 95  
Series 1951

193



Index card, including pertinent information developed through all types of confidential sources. All of the information received from each person, confidential informant or confidential source should be set out in chronological order under the name or symbol number of the respective person, informant or source. The identity of confidential informants and confidential sources should be fully protected by the use of T symbols.

The following general form should be used in the preparation of summary reports.

1. Background
  - a. Birth Data
  - b. Citizenship Status
  - c. Education
  - d. Marital Status
  - e. Military Service Record  
(Including type of discharge, citations, etc.; also list service in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, if any).
  - f. Criminal Record
  - g. Employment
  - h. Residences
  - i. Status of Health (if known).
2. Connections With the Communist Party or Other Revolutionary Groups.
  - a. Information concerning admission to the revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
  - b. History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in, the subversive movement with which the subject is identified.
3. Revolutionary Statements Made By Subject Showing Advocacy of the Overthrow of the Government by Force or Violence.
  - a. List each statement and full known details surrounding each.
  - b. List all statements by the subject showing complete adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines espoused by the subversive group with which the subject is identified.

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4. All Other Activities of Subject Indicating Furtherance of the Program of the Subversive Organization with Which He is Associated.
  - a. Speeches
  - b. Writings
  - c. Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by the subject, or issued while the subject was an officer of the organization.
  - d. Set forth all pertinent contacts between the subject and leaders of the Party.
  - e. Set forth details concerning the subject's attendance at the Lenin School in Russia, attendance at training schools of the subversive organization with which the subject has been identified or activity as an instructor at such schools.
5. False Statements Made By Subject Including Use of Aliases.

Any evidence available reflecting false statements made by the subject and use of aliases may be of extreme value for cross-examination purposes. Such evidence may be in your file which was obtained from passports, voting, marital records, income tax returns, employment and Selective Service records, among others.
6. Miscellaneous
  - a. List here any pertinent items not falling under the above categories.
7. Physical Description
  - a. Set forth here a complete up-to-date description of the subject.

Justification for Security Index Cards

After each case file is reviewed and the investigation brought up to date with the preparation of the summary report, a careful analysis of the individual's subversive activities should be made and if you determine from this analysis that a Security Index card is no longer justified because of evidence of disassociation or disaffection from the revolutionary movement, you should submit your recommendations as to whether or not the subject should be interviewed prior to a cancellation of the Security Index card.

9-22-51  
SAC LETTER NO. 95  
Series 1951

P. 5

There are many factors to be considered in determining whether a Security Index card is justified. As pointed out in No. 10 SAC Letter dated June 11, 1951, because of the security measures and underground activities adopted by the Communist Party, the absence of information reflecting current subversive activities when there is no positive development justifying contrary action is not a sufficient reason for considering an individual presently on the Security Index as no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country.

Periodic Reports in Security Index Cases

Except those cases in which existing instructions require that regular investigative reports be submitted at stated intervals such as Top Functionary, Key Figure and Vital Facility cases as well as cases in certain categories of the Special Section, after a summary report has been prepared in a Security Index case, an administrative tickler should be set up in order that the case can be reopened and reviewed one year from the date of the summary report. This process of reopening cases should continue on a year-to-year basis. In this manner every Security Index case will be brought up to date, reviewed and reevaluated in the light of existing instructions at least once every year. At the time a case is reopened, any material channelized to the case file since the last summary report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date to determine the subject's current activities. If sufficient material is available, a summary report should be prepared at that time. If the material available does not warrant the preparation of a summary report, an investigative report should be prepared. If no derogatory information is available the fact that appropriate confidential informants have been contacted with negative results should be submitted in report form. This is necessary in order that the Department can be advised of the status of the case of each individual who is listed for apprehension in case of an emergency. Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date the matter should be fully analyzed to be certain that the Security Index card is justified in the light of existing instructions.

Status of Project

Thirty days after receipt of this letter you should advise the Bureau of the plans formulated and action taken to date in undertaking the project of preparing summary reports in all Security Index cases. On January 1, 1952, and every three months thereafter as long as the project is not completed in regard to preparing the summary reports requested in cases falling in categories 2, 6 and 7 under "Schedule for Submitting Reports," set out above, you should submit a memorandum to the Bureau reporting the status of this project.

The initial memorandum submitted should furnish the total number of cases in categories 2, 6 and 7 listed for the preparation



UNRECORDED

9-22-51

of summary reports after the review has been made at this time. Subsequent memoranda should also set out that information along with the number of cases in each category in which the summaries have been prepared. All memoranda should be captioned "Summary Reports in Security Index Cases."

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: September 12, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX <sup>W</sup> <sup>0</sup> GENERALPURPOSE

To submit a proposed SAC Letter.

DETAILS

There is attached hereto a proposed SAC Letter requiring the Field to institute a program of preparing summary reports in all Security Index cases. Because of the tremendous burden placed on the Field by these instructions, the preparation will be made on a selected and staggered basis.

There is also included in this SAC Letter instructions that following the preparation of the summary report each case will be opened one year thereafter for review and the preparation of an additional summary report, if warranted.

At the time each summary report is prepared each case will be brought up-to-date and reevaluated to be certain we are on sound ground for retaining the subject's name in the Security Index. By these instructions summary reports will eventually be prepared in all Security Index cases and thereafter cases will be reopened and brought up-to-date on a yearly basis.

ACTION

The proposed SAC Letter is attached for consideration.

OK  
D.

810 changed  
to  
48-17

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 19, 1951

TO Director, FBI

FROM SAC, San Juan

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re Section A, SAC Letter 73, July 24, 1951, instructing all offices to check their records for the purpose of opening cases on individuals who have been reported as having been members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949.

The following records have been checked in this office:

1. All individual security cases opened in this office since January 1, 1949,
2. Our file from January 1, 1949 to date,
3. Our file from January 1, 1949 to date,
4. Our Communist Index.

As a result of the above review in this office twenty-six cases have been reopened and six new cases have been opened for current investigation and consideration for Security Index.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM :  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: April 28, 1951

GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the status concerning the employment of Security Index subjects in vital facilities.

BACKGROUND


SAC Letter Number 26 dated March 13, 1951, captioned as above, instructed all Field Offices to check the employment of Security Index subjects to determine whether the Security Index subjects were employed in any of the vital facilities listed by the National Military Establishment. The Field was further instructed to submit Form FD-122 in those instances where necessary and to advise the Bureau by letter when this check has been completed.

All Offices have now completed this phase of the Bureau's instructions as set forth in the SAC Letter and have so advised the Bureau.

ACTION

For your information.

\* Note: A tally is being made to determine exactly how many Security Index subjects are so employed. It is now estimated to be in the vicinity of 2,000. A memorandum showing the exact count will be submitted in the next several days. (JAS:pc)





812

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date July 13, 1951

To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office or Division San Diego Office

SUGGESTION:

It is being suggested that FD-186 be revised to include the following:

- (24) Position in Party
- (25) Source and Date
- (26) Evaluation

Its advantages are:

This suggestion would then supply all the necessary information for either the Security Index Card or the Communist Index Card. The clerical employee would not have to write a routing slip to the agent for the needed information and he would not have to review the file the second time.

It should save at least \$ \_\_\_\_\_ annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

It is believed this suggestion has merit, and it is recommended that it be considered by the Bureau.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: September 21, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week 83 new cards were added to the Security Index and 11 cards were canceled, a net increase of 72 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,950.

814  
changed  
to

3-15

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: September 22, 1951

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
VERAL MOULDER

RE SAC letter #26 dated March 13, 1951, Section A.

All reports requested in SAC letter #26 have been submitted and all dissemination of appropriate information has been made. This phase of the Security Index Program is being maintained in a current status by the Baltimore Office.



813  
changed to  
47-28

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, San Francisco  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

DATE: September 22, 1951

Re Part A of SAC Letter 73, Series 1951, dated 7/24/51.

As requested by the Bureau, the files of this office have been reviewed and cases have been reopened on all individuals reported to be members of the Communist Party and related Marxist parties since January 1, 1949, where such subjects are not already on the Security Index or where cases are not pending on such subjects. A total of 151 cases have been opened as a result of this review.

It is pointed out that in August of 1950 a complete review of more than 30,000 security files was made in an attempt to determine those cases in which the subjects should appear on the Security Index under regulations set forth by the Bureau at that time which was shortly after the Korean police incident. Many of the individuals who were members of the Communist Party and related parties since January of 1949 were considered for investigation in August 1950, and consequently over 2,000 cases were opened at that time. As a result, the number of cases during the present file review has been considerably less.



8/6  
changed to  
47-29

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, San Francisco  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: September 22, 1951

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter 26, Series 1951, my letter 3/21/51, Bulet 3/27/51,  
and my letter 6/15/51.

For the information of the Bureau, reports have been submitted  
and appropriately disseminated to local intelligence agencies and to the  
Coast Guard on all Security Index subjects employed in the vital facility  
which is the San Francisco water front.



817 changed to  
3-16

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

DATE: September 22, 1951

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS-  
SECURITY INDEX CARDS

Re SAC letter #73 dated July 24, 1951, Section A.

The Baltimore Office has completed the review of its files as directed in SAC letter #73. This included a review of all individual security cases opened since January 1, 1949 and all information placed in and files since that date. The file has been utilized by the Baltimore Office for matters which are of exclusively Communist nature since before the time the -classification was set up for non-Communist security matters. The Communist index was also reviewed.

In August 1950 the Baltimore Office reviewed all closed security cases in its files and considered for active investigation all cases which showed Communist Party or Communist Party front activity after August 1, 1949. Approximately 232 cases were opened for investigation as a result of that review.

During the current review, consideration was given to tabulations made during August 1950 review concerning the type and period of activity as well as the date cases were RUC to other divisions. A current review was made in any case where it would have been possible for a memo to have been filed showing Communist Party activities on the part of the subject since January 1, 1949, although the case itself may have been opened and closed prior to that date.

The current review resulted in the opening of 37 cases for active investigation in accordance with instructions in SAC letter #73.

818 changed to  
18-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 21, 1951

FROM : *JH* SAC, Honolulu

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter #75 7/24/51.

As instructed in re SAC letter, a review has been made of all the cases opened in this office since 1/1/49, a review has been made of the files since that date and a check has been made of the Communist Index with a view toward determining whether any cases should be opened as a result of individuals having been reported members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist or revolutionary groups on or after January 1, 1949.

The review has disclosed that in all cases where there has been an allegation of Communist Party membership, or membership in any revolutionary group, on or after January 1, 1949, on the part of any individual, a case had been opened, appropriate investigation conducted and the individual was considered for inclusion in the Security Index. It has continually been the policy of this office to open cases for active investigation where there has been a definite allegation of membership in the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups.

Accordingly, as a result of the review of all cases, files and Communist Index, no new individual cases were opened. The office will continue the practice of opening cases for investigation and consideration for inclusion in the Security Index in all instances where allegations are received that individuals are members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary groups.

819 changed to  
37-25

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 26, 1951

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Remylet dated 12-29-49, in which a system concerning the maintenance of the Security Index cards in this office was outlined. This system called for periodic verification of the information appearing on the Security Index cards to be made on an alphabetical basis.

This is to advise that this system has been changed as follows:

A six by nine tickler has been prepared for each Security Index card. This tickler will be used to insure that each Security Index card is verified within a six months period. It will also serve to record the notes of the agent handling the ticklers and will be set up so that 33, or more as the total of Security Index cards increases, can be verified each week. As the FD-154 is handled by the agent handling the Security Index system, the tickler will be reset for six months. Instructions have been issued that agents handling FD-154's complete them within 30 days. At the time the FD-154 is prepared, an administrative tickler is also prepared for the Supervisor who sets this tickler for 30 days.

This system conforms to instructions issued by the Bureau in SAC Letter #53 dated 5-26-51 and will serve the purpose of insuring that each Security Index card is examined and the necessary verification made within the required period.



SAC, LOS ANGELES

9/20/51

DIRECTOR, FBI

SUGGESTION RE MARKING CERTAIN SECURITY FILES IN A DISTINCTIVE MANNER

ReBulet 6/30/51, authorizing your office to stamp file covers in the manner indicated and requesting that the Bureau be advised as to the effectiveness of its use.

Please advise Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division, as to the success experienced with this procedure in order that the matter may be considered for broad application throughout the service.



821  
changed  
to

23-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director FBI  
FROM : *JWB* SAC Kansas City

DATE: 9-27-51

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

This is to advise that the review of cases as instructed in  
SAC Letter 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951, has been completed and  
as a result of the review one case was reopened.



822  
changed to

35-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

DATE: September 24, 1951

FROM : SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, Section A.

This is to advise that reviews of all individual security cases which have been opened in this Office since January 1, 1949; the file from January 1, 1949, to date; and the Communist Index of persons reported as members of such organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949, have been made.

These reviews have resulted in the opening of 45 cases which are presently under investigation.

P23  
changed to  
5-18

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 27, 1951


TO : Director, FBI

FROM : *JW* SAC, Boston

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter No. 73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951.

The review of security cases requested in captioned SAC Letter has been completed. As a result of this review, 260 Security Matter cases have been opened, pursuant to Bureau instructions.



824 changed to 62-7

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: October 3, 1951

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Albuquerque  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS IN  
SECURITY INDEX CASES

Re SAC Letter #95 dated September 22, 1951, Paragraph B, requesting that the Bureau be advised within 30 days of receipt of referenced letter of the plans formulated and action taken to prepare summary reports in all Security Index cases. Referenced letter also requested specific information concerning certain categories of cases.

The Albuquerque Division has no Security Index subjects maintained in the Special Section of the Index and, therefore, will have no summary reports to prepare for subjects in this category.

In Category #6, namely, all remaining Security Index cases not falling under Category #1 to #5, where no pertinent derogatory information has been submitted in report form since January 1, 1949, the Albuquerque Division has only one case file falling in this category.

As to Category #7, the Albuquerque Division has 39 subjects.

For the further information of the Bureau, the following breakdown is submitted:

Special Section	None
Top Functionaries	None
Key Figures	6
Vital Facilities Subjects	8
Category #6	1
Category #7	39

A schedule of these Security Index Subjects has been drawn up in this Division and assignments have been made and distributed to the Agents for the preparation of summary reports on all Security Index subjects.

changed  
to  
62-7

Let. to Director  
Re: SUMMARY REPORTS IN  
SECURITY INDEX CASES

The totals of such summary reports scheduled by 30-day periods are as follows:

From the present date to December 1, 1951	25
December 1, 1951, to January 1, 1952	9
January 1, 1952, to February 1, 1952	5
February 1, 1952, to March 1, 1952	9
March 1, 1952, to April 1, 1952	6

In accordance with referenced SAC Letter, the Bureau will be advised periodically of the progress being made in the preparation of these reports.

July 2, 1951

PURPOSE

To answer the Director's inquiry and to attach a memorandum to

DETAILS

Attached is a memorandum from \_\_\_\_\_ dated June 27, 1951, on which the Director commented, "What about this? It raises a serious point."

\_\_\_\_\_ memorandum is in answer to Bureau memorandum of June 4, 1951, in which he was advised that information was received indicating that subject is believed responsible for a falling off in production of approximately fifteen to twenty percent at the American Bearing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, which firm has contracts with the Army and Navy. \_\_\_\_\_ comments that the last report received containing any indication of Communist Party activity was dated October 7, 1946, and that it may be extremely difficult to persuade a hearing officer that solely on the basis of acts committed five or more years previously an order of detention is justified.

For your information subject has been on the Security Index since March 23, 1944. \_\_\_\_\_ is correct in his statement that the last report indicating Communist Party activity on the part of the subject was dated October 7, 1946. Subsequent reports have failed to indicate Communist Party activity. The last report submitted was dated August 16, 1950.

The subject has been an agitator in the labor field for many years and in 1942 a confidential informant reported that the subject had been purged from District 50 of the United Mine Workers because of his Communist activities. In July, 1942, he is reported to have arranged to contact \_\_\_\_\_, then \_\_\_\_\_ of the Communist Party of Michigan, using the serial number of a dollar bill as a prearranged means of identification. During the same year, as International Representative of the CIO, he engaged in strongarm methods in recruiting union members at Grand Rapids,

Michigan. During 1943, he is reported to have engaged in Communist Party activities at Buffalo, New York, being registered in a Communist Party class of instruction. On October 22, 1943, a confidential informant at Buffalo, New York, reported the subject to be a dues-paying member of the Communist Party, a member of the Communist Party Niagara Frontier Committee, and the Twelfth Ward Branch of the Communist Party. In 1944, he was in contact with Communist Party members at Auburn, New York, and on August 2, 1945, he attended a meeting of the Communist Party at Syracuse, New York, reporting on the success of his union activity at Auburn, New York, and at the Communist Party meeting suggested a plan for recruiting members into the Communist Party. He was elected a member of the State Committee of the Communist Party for the State of New York on August 12, 1945. On May 13, 1946, information was received that he was using the Party name of .

You will note that even though no recent Communist Party activity has been reported there is every reason to believe that the subject is a concealed Communist in view of the underground method by which he contacted the Michigan Communist Party State Secretary in 1942, the use of the Party name and that fact his present activity at Indianapolis follows the same pattern of labor agitation used during the time there was direct evidence of Communist Party membership. There is no positive evidence that he has changed his beliefs or has disaffected from the Communist Party. Past information indicates this subject to be a trained experienced Communist in the labor field.

Although memorandum comments that there has been no Communist Party activity reported since 1946, subject's recent activities at the American Bearing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, follow the same tactics he used when there was direct evidence of Communist Party affiliation, and, of course, those activities will be included in the next investigative report.

The policy of retaining Security Index cards in similar situations, when no Communist Party activity has been reported in several years, has been presented to the Executive's Conference by the Security Division. By Executive's Conference memorandum dated May 1, 1951, attached, under Item (2), the Executive's Conference was of the unanimous opinion that when it has not been possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a Security Index subject placed on the Index several years ago, the removal of such subjects from the Security Index would represent a far greater risk than their retention despite the lack of evidence of current Communist Party activities.



7-2-51

In memorandum attached dated April 25, 1951, from you will note on page two that at a previous conference , agreed with \* \* \* and concept of the Emergency Detention Program that such individuals are potentially dangerous even though there is no evidence of current Communist Party activity available and should be apprehended in an emergency.

Also for your information subject's past activities are such as warrant his name being continued in the Security Index under (1) the Bureau's Security Index Standards of which the Department has been advised previously (2) Regulations of the Attorney General as set forth in the Department's Portfolio for the Emergency Detention Program and (3) in the Department's revised Security Index Standards furnished the Bureau on June 1, 1951.

ACTION

If you approve, (1) there is attached a memorandum for Mr. McInerney pointing out the facts in instant case and our belief that there is full justification for retaining subject's name in the Security Index; (2) there is attached a memorandum to the Indianapolis and New York Offices requesting additional investigation.

8 25  
changed to  
46-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

AIRMAIL

DATE: 10-6-51

FROM: SAC, San Diego

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

*plc*

Re SAC Letter No. 95, Series 1951, dated September 22, 1951.

The San Diego Office has several subjects in its Security Index who are not and have not been, so far as is known, members of the Communist Party, but who are active in Communist front groups.

When preparing summary reports, as outlined in referenced SAC Letter, advice is requested whether "Connections with Communist Party front groups" may be substituted under Section No. 2 for "connections with the Communist Party" in the event there is no evidence of direct Communist Party affiliation on the part of the Subject.



825  
changed to  
46-10

October 11, 1951

SAC, San Diego  
Director, FBI  
SECURITY INDEX  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS  
Bufile

Reurlet dated October 6, 1951.

The Bureau has no objection to the use of a heading in summary reports in Security Index cases to cover activities in Communist front groups. The suggested outline as to form and content of summary reports set out in SAC Letter Number 95, Series 1951, dated September 22, 1951, was furnished only as a general form or guide in the matter.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, BUTTE  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: October 2, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 26.

Referenced SAC Letter provides for placing a vital facilities code number on the security index card of a subject employed in that vital facility. In one place the SAC letter points out that the subject should be "employed" in the vital facility. In another place the SAC letter uses the phraseology "where the subject is employed in a plant designated as a vital facility or has access to the facility in the usual course of his employment." From this it would appear that the vital facilities code number should appear on the security index card of every subject who is employed in a vital facility or has access to it during the course of his employment.

Now the problem presents itself concerning union representatives. For example, Butte has the problem concerning a security index card subject who is international representative of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. This Union has jurisdiction over employees employed in a vital facility, but there is nothing to indicate that employment by the Union gives him access to the vital facility. Of course, it does give him an opportunity to exert influence over other employees employed in the vital facility. It would not appear that the vital facility code number should appear on the security index card pertaining to

The Bureau's observations concerning this would be appreciated.

626 changed to  
7-11

SAC, Butte

November 9, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Reurlet October 2, 1951, wherein you made reference to SAC Letter Number 26 of March 13, 1951, and requested the Bureau's observations concerning the statements made in your letter.

You are correct in your conclusion that an individual should be considered as coming under the instructions with regard to persons connected with vital facilities if that individual is employed in a vital facility or has access to the vital facility during the course of his employment. The term "having access to" shall not be construed as meaning individuals who might occasionally present themselves at the vital facility. It should be restricted to persons who have physical access to the vital facility in connection with their employment on a regular basis.

It does not appear that you have a problem with regard to [redacted] who is international representative of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers inasmuch as you state that there is nothing to indicate that [redacted] employment by the union gives him access to the vital facility mentioned. The fact that [redacted] exerts influence over employees in the vital facility should not be construed as placing him in the category where the vital facility code number should appear on his Security Index card. Persons over whom he has influence who are Communists and who are employed in the vital facility are the individuals who represent the potential dangerousness insofar as the vital facility itself is concerned. These are the subjects who come within the meaning of instructions concerning Security Index subjects who are employed in vital facilities.

827 changed to

62-8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Albuquerque  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS IN  
SECURITY INDEX CASES

DATE: 10/6/51

Re SAC Letter #95 dated September 22, 1951, Section B.

In preparing the summary reports requested it has been observed that in several of the security index subjects' cases of this office and likewise of the Denver Office, there is information reflecting the Communist political association card number of the subject for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 which information was secured by the Denver Office. This information has been reported by the Denver Office as being non admissible evidence.

Since this particular question will affect several subjects of this office and undoubtedly several subjects of the Denver Office, it is requested that the Bureau advise whether or not such information should be placed in the summary report and if so under what category. In the event the Bureau does not desire this information to be placed in a report, the Bureau is requested to advise whether or not it desires such information by cover letter to the report.

827  
changed to  
62-8

SAC, Albuquerque

October 29, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX -  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

Reurlet October 6, 1951, requesting the Bureau's advice as to whether information reflecting Communist Political Association membership card numbers of the subjects of these reports should be included in the reports even though they are non-admissible evidence.

Such information shall be included in these reports in all instances regardless of the admissibility of the evidence because of the nature of the sources thereof. SAC Letter Number 95 states that each report shall reflect all information having any pertinency as to whether or not there is justification for a Security Index card, including pertinent information developed through all types of confidential sources. Of course, in reporting information of the type reflected in your letter care should be taken in the selection of terminology to avoid unnecessary disclosure of the nature of the sources. Temporary symbols should be utilized and the identities of the sources reflected in the administrative portion of the reports.

828  
changed to  
6-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: October 4, 1951

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Buffalo

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Re SAC Letter #73, July 24, 1951.

Review of files completed as per instructions.

A total of 84 cases have been opened pursuant to these instructions.



829  
changed  
to  
21-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: October 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

ReBulet to Boston, 10-5-51, and SAC Letter #26,  
Series 1951, 3-13-51.

The Indianapolis Office has submitted reports on each security index subject employed in a vital facility except four instances. In those instances it was determined that there was little or no information in the file indicating Communist Party activity, and as soon as current investigation is conducted, reports will be promptly submitted.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NICHOLS

DATE: 9-28-51

FROM: A. E. LEONARD

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There is attached hereto a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship status, and others on one of the "special" lists.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of September 19, 1951.



831

*list*

SAC, Omaha

October 3, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
REGISTERED MAIL  
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECURITY INDEX

ReBulet dated December 29, 1950.

There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.

The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.

*pk*  
Enclosure

~~██████████~~  
*jk*

EX - 28

RECORDED-86  
INDEXED-88

OCT 6 1951

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RECEIVED - FBI

~~██████████~~ - 831

*at*


*7/15*

*pk*

view for possible

Control - FBI  
OCT 4 - 1951  
MAILED 25

RECEIVED - FBI  
F. B. I.  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



832  
changed to  
31-14

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: October 9, 1951

FROM : *[Signature]* SAC, Newark

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

Re SAC Letter 100, Series 1950, dated 9/28/50; and  
Bulet to Birmingham dated 10/5/51.

A check of the Security Index cards reveals that all addresses have been verified within the past six months, or are in the process of being verified. However, in this connection, it will be noted that several subjects have moved and their whereabouts are unknown. In these instances, active investigation is being conducted in an effort to locate them.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Los Angeles  
SUBJECT: SUGGESTION RE MARKING CERTAIN SECURITY FILES IN A DISTINCTIVE MANNER  
SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL  
Attention: Training and Inspection Division

DATE: September 26, 1951

Rebulet 9/20/51.

The Bureau's attention is invited to my letter of 9/18/51 captioned "USE OF C.I. AND S.I. STAMPS ON FILE COVERS" concerning this matter.

SAC, Boston

October 5, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

- GENERAL

Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951, in which you were instructed that a current report must be submitted within ninety days from that date on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility unless a report had been submitted during the previous six months. The vital or key facilities referred to were those so designated by the National Military Establishment. The vital facilities list naming the vital facilities located in your field division territory was furnished to you along with No Number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951, captioned "Vital Facilities, National Military Establishment, Internal Security - C; Confidential Plant Informants."

In SAC Letter Number 26, you were requested to advise the Bureau by letter when the requested reports had been submitted. You are instructed to advise by return mail as to whether the reports requested have been submitted to the Bureau.

SAC, Birmingham


October 5, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

Reference is made to Item (C), SAC Letter Number 100, dated December 28, 1950, in which you were instructed beginning January 15, 1951, and each six months thereafter, to advise the Bureau by letter as to whether all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six months.

No record can be found that the advice in this matter due July 15, 1951, has been received at the Bureau from your office. You should advise by return mail as to the status of this matter.





836  
changed  
to  
36-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, FBI

DATE: October 2, 1951

FROM SAC, Omaha

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS,  
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

The file review outlined in SAC Letter #73, Series 1951, dated July 24, 1951, has been completed in the Omaha Division.

As a result of this review, eleven cases have been opened for investigation.

#57 changed to  
53-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

243

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 10, 1951

FROM : SAC, WFO

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

ReBuLet to Boston and other offices, October 5, 1951  
captioned as above.

In response to SAC Letter #26, March 13, 1951, Section A,  
WFO submitted a letter to the Bureau, April 25, 1951, captioned as  
above, advising that at the time WFO had on its Security Index six  
individuals who were then employed in key facilities. They were:

FEB 5 1953  
At the present time the only individuals on the Security Index  
of WFO, who are employed in key facilities are and  
, mentioned above. The following is to be noted regarding  
these subjects:



838  
changed  
to

13-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (AMSD)

DATE: October 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Denver

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
VITAL FACILITIES

ReBulet dated 10/5/51 to Boston, copy to Denver.

The Bureau instructions set forth in SAC Letter No. 26 regarding the reporting on Security Index subjects who are employed on vital facilities have been followed by this office. This office, however, inadvertently failed to advise the Bureau by letter that these reports had been submitted in accordance with the SAC Letter #26.

839  
changed  
to  
46-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*me* TO : Director, FBI (100-358086)

DATE: 10-10-51

FROM : SAC, San Diego

AIRMAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

ReBulet October 5, 1951.

The San Diego Division presently maintains 94 Security Index Cards. All information reflected in these cards is in an up-to-date status and addresses for all Security Index Subjects were checked during the six-month period prior to July 15, 1951.

840 cl used to 26-22

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Los Angeles  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORTS IN SECURITY INDEX CASES

DATE: October 5, 1951

This letter is submitted for the purpose of making certain observations concerning the program outlined in SAC Letter No. 95, Section B, dated 9/22/51. An additional memorandum will be prepared setting forth the plans formulated and action taken to date in undertaking this project.

Various questions have arisen during the careful consideration which has been afforded the Bureau's instructions and toward the end of achieving uniformity in the submission of summary reports, the following is set out for the consideration of the Bureau.

STATUS:


Summary reports do not normally reflect the status of the case and it is recommended that in order to permit the proper posting of these reports, they be so dictated as to reflect the status at the end of the details.

DISSEMINATION:

Summary reports are not normally disseminated by the field. However, the Bureau's instructions state, "Each summary report should be suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau...." Inasmuch as in many instances information not previously disseminated to the local intelligence branches of the armed services will be incorporated into these summary reports, and inasmuch as it is the Bureau's responsibility to disseminate such derogatory subversive information as may be of interest to these agencies, it is recommended that the summary reports be disseminated in the field exactly as the normal investigative report would have been in the same case.

ORGANIZATION:

The Bureau's instructions state, "All of the information received from each person, confidential informant or confidential



"source should be set out in chronological order under the name or symbol number of the respective person, informant or source." The Bureau has also furnished the field with a general form to be used in the preparation of these summary reports, which form consists of a series of headings and subheadings. It would appear that in many instances information will be furnished by an individual confidential informant concerning two or more of these suggested subheadings. In order to conform with the outline recommended, information will be set forth under the pertinent heading chronologically by source unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau. This procedure may mean that a particular informant will be listed two or more times under two or more subheadings.

"T" SYMBOLS:

Inasmuch as the submission of summary reports is a continuing project and it is anticipated that reports will be submitted on an annual basis hereafter, it is recommended that the "T" symbols used in the summary reports on a particular subject be coordinated so that a particular "T" symbol will in each report refer to the same informant or source.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:

No instructions were furnished concerning the submission of documentary evidence in the form of exhibits. While it is apparent that the field should not at this time become engaged in a wholesale search for documentary evidence similar to that used in connection with the preparation of Smith Act summaries, it is also apparent that investigative effort should not be duplicated and that in the preparation of these summaries requests will be made of auxiliary offices to verify certain information, such as birth data, prior employments, etc., together with additional details concerning subversive activity within other divisions. Unless documentary evidence is secured in connection with this requested investigation, it may at some time in the future become necessary to request that the same leads be again covered for the sole purpose of securing photostatic and other documentary material. It is the suggestion of this office, where such essential information as birth and/or citizenship data is being requested, that the auxiliary office be instructed at this time to secure photostatic copies of the original records, thus obviating duplication of effort at some future date. It is also suggested that the field be instructed to prepare in the form of

exhibits such documentary material as may be available in its files concerning the subversive activities of each subject. It is not recommended that extensive research be conducted in an effort to document prior employment and residence data.

#### SCOPE OF REPORTS:

The Bureau instructs, "All pertinent information contained in your files which has not been included in report form should be set out in the summary report." Inasmuch as the Bureau has made a clear distinction between the summary reports discussed in SAC Letter No. 95 and the normal investigative report, the question has arisen as to whether, in the above-noted instruction, the Bureau does not mean that all pertinent information which has not been included in a previous summary report should be set out in the current summary report. It would appear, if these summary reports are to be the "usable reports on security index subjects" to be furnished U. S. Attorneys, that it would be necessary to include all available information, whether previously reported or not, in the first summary report concerning each subject.

#### DISAFFECTED SUBJECTS:

The Bureau instructs that "After each case file is reviewed and the investigation brought up to date with the preparation of the summary report, a careful analysis of the individual's subversive activities should be made and if you determine from this analysis that a Security Index card is no longer justified because of evidence of disassociation or disaffection from the revolutionary movement, you should submit your recommendations as to whether or not the Subject should be interviewed prior to a cancellation of the Security Index card."

While it is recognized that all facts pertaining to an individual subject should be made available to the Bureau for its consideration in connection with a recommendation for interview of an individual subject, it is believed that a considerable amount of investigative time and effort may be spent in the preparation of summary reports in these instances. It would appear that at an early stage in the current investigation of a case the investigating agent will determine the presence of "evidence of disassociation or disaffection from the revolutionary movement," and that at this point he should promptly submit to the Bureau a letter setting forth such evidence, together with a

840 changed to  
26-22

brief summary of any other pertinent data not previously reported, along with his recommendation for interview of the Subject. It is believed that unless this procedure is followed, it will be necessary for the agent to spend a number of days developing data concerning the previous employment, previous residence and other background data for inclusion in the summary report which might better be spent in the investigation of individuals reported currently engaged in subversive activities. It is, therefore, recommended that the Bureau consider authorizing the field to refrain from unnecessary submission of summary reports in cases where there is evidence of disassociation or disaffection.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Bureau's observations and suggestions concerning the above will be appreciated.



840  
changed  
to  
26-22

SAC, Los Angeles

November 15, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX -  
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

Reurlet dated October 5, 1951, containing observations and suggestions with regard to the matter of preparing summary reports.

This is to advise you that the suggestions made in your letter are receiving consideration along with other suggestions submitted by other offices. The policy established as a result of these suggestions will be contained in a forthcoming SAC Letter.

841

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: October 5, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week 66 new cards were added to the Security Index and 10 cards were canceled, a net increase of 56 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 17,061.

842  
changed  
to  
52-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Springfield  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: 10-10-51

Reurlet 10-5-51 referring to SAC letter 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951.

This is to advise that all the reports called for in the above mentioned SAC letter have been submitted to the Bureau by this office.

This office maintains an administrative six-month tickler on these individuals, and reports are submitted at least once every six months unless the material channeled into these files necessitate a report at more frequent intervals.

843 changed to

49-11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (

FROM : SAC, Savannah

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

DATE: October 10, 1951

ReBuLet 10/5/51 to Birmingham, copy to Savannah and other interested offices.

An examination of the files in the Savannah Division on the four Security Index subjects being maintained in this office reflects that the verification of addresses were made in accordance with instructions contained in Item (C), SAC Letter Number 100 dated December 28, 1950; however, inadvertently the Bureau was not informed of such verification.

The only Security Index subject on who verification of address could not be made was \_\_\_\_\_ of Charleston, S. C. The Bureau was informed by letter from this office dated August 13, 1951, entitled " \_\_\_\_\_, INTERNAL SECURITY - C" that \_\_\_\_\_ had left Charleston, S. C. and his whereabouts were unknown. Further, that his photograph and description had been forwarded to the El Paso Division in accordance with Bureau instructions.

844  
changed  
to  
30-14

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/9/51

FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VITAL FACILITIES

Rebulet 10/5/51.

Reports on Security Index subjects employed in vital or key facilities have in all cases been distributed to intelligence agencies having responsibility or interest.

845  
changed  
to  
42-14

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 10, 1951

FROM : SAC, ST. LOUIS

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Rebulet October 5, 1951 to Boston, copy to St. Louis.

The reports requested in SAC letter No. 26, series 1951, dated March 13, 1951, have been submitted by the St. Louis Division.



846  
changed  
to  
43-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: October 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

ReBuLet October 5, 1951 to Poston, cc Minneapolis.

Please be advised that current reports were submitted on all Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities except where a report had been submitted within previous six months at the time the instructions were received.

847  
changed  
to  
5-19.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: October 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, Boston

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES

Reurlet October 5, 1951.

All Security Index Cards in this office are in up-to-date status and addresses for these security subjects have been checked within the last six months.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 25, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

On the afternoon of April 25, while and I were discussing another matter with of the Department at his office, he brought up the matter of the Security Index. Present also were and

advised that he is having a review, started within the next week of Security Index cases. From the conversation it appeared that he had instructed to review 2,000 of these cases immediately.

You will recall that the Department was seeking a method of having these cases reviewed without divulging the nature of the Emergency Detention Program to the reviewing attorneys. advised that the attorneys will review the cases based on the provisions of Section 2 of the McCarran Act. He stated that these provisions are not in conflict with the Bureau standards for the Security Index, with the exception of the provision showing membership in the Communist Party since January 1, 1949.

inquired whether the subjects of the Security Index generally are shown to be active in the Party since January 1, 1949. I told him definitely they were not; that in a great many cases no activity could be proven since January 1, 1949. I pointed out that as early as 1948 the Party had ceased to maintain membership lists or to issue membership cards, and in many instances members of the Party had ceased their outward activities and many had even gone into hiding.

stated that in reviewing a few of the cases he had noted that no activity in the Party was shown since 1945 or 1946 and in many instances reports had not been submitted. I corrected him in this, pointing out that we had submitted reports in all of these cases in 1948 and 1949, although some of the reports did not show current Party activities at that time. I further pointed out that in key figure cases, numbering approximately 1,500, reports were submitted to the Department at approximately six-month intervals; further, that in any cases where the individual is currently active, reports are submitted.

wondered what the reaction of a hearing board would be if no activity was shown since 1945 or 1946. I pointed out to him that if by the review of the Department of these cases the Department felt that such individuals should be removed, we would take such action, upon instructions; however, I pointed out that these individuals were placed on the Security Index under the standards used by the Bureau, which had been furnished to the Department, because the individuals were believed to be potentially dangerous and, under the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party and its instructions for members to cease outward Party activities, such individuals may still be considered potentially dangerous. I inquired what answer the Department would have if, in an emergency, such an individual blew up a plant and Congress asked why he had not been picked up in view of his record of Communist Party activity. He stated that he was of the opinion such individuals should be picked up and that their listing in the Security Index was correct.

I told [redacted] frankly that our chief concern at this time is to insure that all potentially dangerous persons are on the Security Index and our principal efforts have been devoted to that goal and, consequently, up-to-date reports have not been rendered on many of the individuals who are on the Security Index already.

I asked [redacted] specifically whether the Department had any thought of changing its Emergency Detention Program to conform to the McCarran Act. He said the Department did not.

I requested [redacted] to furnish us with a list of the attorneys who are going to make this review and a set of the instructions or standards which the attorneys will use in reviewing the cases. He said these would be furnished to us.

OBSERVATIONS:

You will recall that the question of submitting current reports on Security Index subjects was taken up at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference, at which time the

Dept. of Justice  
Security Index  
Cases

field pointed out that the most pressing problem was to work the pending cases to get the subjects on the Security Index where warranted. The Conference recommended we hold off attempting to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects, in view of the above more pressing problem. This was taken up at the Executives Conference and it was agreed that we should not press the field for such reports at this time, but should resurvey the condition of the work on September 1, 1951, for the purpose of seeing whether we could require the submission of reports.

Resurvey now. H.

Dept. of Justice  
Security Index  
Cases

Our present policy in retaining persons on the Security Index, where no activity has been shown for several years, is on the agenda of the Executives Conference.

Upon receipt of the names of the attorneys and the standards to be used by them from the Department, we will check their names through our files and carefully examine the standards.

Ass. H. ✓ JH  
Take up promptly.  
H.

Be sure we place complete responsibility on Dept as to who is to be removed from Security Index.

H

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: May 1, 1951

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

On May 1, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_ considered problems in connection with the Security Index, as follows:

- (1) Should the field be required to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects at this time?

It was pointed out that the question of submitting current reports on all Security Index subjects was taken up recently at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference held April 2-3, 1951, at which time it was strongly recommended that the Bureau not require the submission of current reports because of the more pressing problem of investigating pending cases for possible inclusion in the Security Index. To this, the Executives' Conference agreed, but recommended that the condition of the security work be re-surveyed on September 1, 1951, for the purpose of seeing whether we could require the submission of reports at that time.

This matter was also considered by the Executives' Conference on May 1, 1951. A survey of the pending work reflects that the number of pending cases in the classifications, 65, 100 and 105, have increased each month during December, 1950, and January, February and March, 1951. Likewise, the number of delinquent cases in these three categories has increased at the end of each of these four months. As an example, at the end of December, there were 28,202 pending cases which increased to 30,857 at the end of March. At the end of December, there were 15,072 delinquent cases which increased to 16,873 at the end of March. This would reflect an increase in this type of work and consequently indicates that we cannot cut down on the investigative effort applied to this type of case.

In addition, it was noted that many of the field offices have written current reports, particularly the smaller offices. In addition:

- |  |                      |       |
|--|----------------------|-------|
| (1) The field submits reports on key figures each six months   | - approximately      | 1,500 |
| (2) Over 3,600 Security Index subjects have been added since June, 1950. Consequently, there are current reports on this number  |                      | 3,600 |
| (3) The field has been instructed to submit reports on all SI subjects in vital facilities. This will number approximately 2,000 |                      | 2,000 |
|  | (Approximate) Total: | 7,100 |

849

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Thus, it will be seen that of the 15,284 Security Index subjects, we have or are requiring current reports on a large percentage. The problem of delinquent reports lies in the large offices where there is a heavy backlog of security cases to be worked.

Executives' Conference

Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we not require the field to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects in view of the fact that the more pressing problem at this time is to work the pending cases and place on the Security Index those individuals who are potentially dangerous. The Conference recommended that we re-survey this matter again on September 1, 1951.

\* \* \* \* \*

- (2) Should we retain persons on the Security Index where no activity has been shown for several years?

It was pointed out that because the Communist Party has ceased issuing membership cards and ceased maintaining membership lists since 1949; because of instructions by the Party that many members should go underground or divorce themselves from open participation in Party activities; and because of the conspiratorial nature of the Party, it has not been possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a number of Security Index subjects who were placed on the Security Index several years ago. As a result, we have on the Security Index today a considerable number of subjects on whom current Party activities are not reflected. These subjects, however, were placed on the Security Index on a sound basis, that is, in keeping with the standards which had been set up by the Bureau for Security Index subjects.

It was pointed out that if an emergency occurs, it will not be possible to present to the hearing boards evidence of current activity on the part of some of these subjects. It was pointed out that these subjects have been retained on the Security Index as potentially dangerous because of their history of Communist Party activity and no evidence to the effect that they are no longer dangerous exists other than the mere passage of time. It was also pointed out that if one of these subjects were removed from the list and he committed sabotage during an emergency, it would be very difficult to justify our position in having removed him from the Index.

Executives' Conference

Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference was of the unanimous opinion that the removal of these subjects from the Security Index would present a far greater risk than their retention despite the lack of evidence of current Communist Party activities. The Conference, therefore, recommended that they be retained on the Index.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(3) Should we refer to the Department cases for specific decisions where we do not have evidence of activity for several years?

It was pointed out that the question had arisen as to whether the Department should be asked to pass on the desirability of retaining on the Security Index those individuals on whom we have not developed current activities in the Party during a several year period, such as for the last three years or the last five years. The thought behind this would be to have the Department share the responsibility for keeping these people on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended against referring these cases specifically to the Department. The Conference felt that we have referred all cases to the Department and the Department is in a position to raise an issue on any case. The Conference further felt that we would not be relieved of any responsibility by any decision on the part of the Department.

\* \* \* \* \*

Should we interview individuals carried on the Security Index on whom we have developed no current activities?

It was pointed out that at the present time before an individual can be removed from the Security Index, he must be interviewed or a valid reason to the contrary given. In addition, where the field or the Bureau concludes that an interview with a subject may be productive, a recommendation is made to interview the subject and the interview is conducted if the Bureau approves.

The question here is should we, because of the mere passage of time for a period such as three years or five years without evidence of any Party activity, instruct that the Security Index subject be interviewed. The purpose would be to ascertain the attitude of the subject as a standard to determine whether he should be continued on the Index.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation:

The Conference unanimously recommended against interviews based on the mere passage of time. The Conference felt that if a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

solid basis existed for placing the individual on the Index, he should remain thereon unless a strong reason to the contrary existed. The Conference felt that unless the subject takes positive action to remove himself from the Party and to so indicate, the Bureau is justified in retaining him on the Index regardless of the passage of time.

\* \* \* \* \*

- (5) As a result of current investigations we develop information of past Communist activity but not current activity by individuals. Such individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they do not meet our standards for the Index. Should we interview them to determine their present attitude?

It was pointed out that during current investigations many times we develop information showing routine Communist Party activities of several years ago on the part of individuals. However, we are unable to develop any information reflecting current activities on the part of these individuals. Such a person is not placed on the Security Index because we have not developed current activity. The question is should we interview such individuals with a view to developing information to justify their inclusion or exception from the Security Index.

It was pointed out that by this interview we are in effect bringing up the subject's activities to the present time. If he is uncooperative and indicates that he still adheres to the Party line, we should consider him a potential danger and place him on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that in instances where we develop that a subject engaged in routine Communist activities several years ago but we do not develop evidence of current Party activities, we should interview the subject with a view to determining whether he is potentially dangerous and should be considered for the Security Index.

\* \* \* \* \*

- (6) Should we advise the Department of each instance wherein we remove a subject from the Security Index?

It was pointed out that we remove an average of six to eight subjects from the Security Index each week. No subject is removed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

from the Security Index unless a very strong reason therefor exists, such as death, deportation, arrest and incarceration for several years, enrollment in the U. S. Armed Forces, and defection coupled with complete cooperation. Each month the up-to-date list of Security Index subjects is hand-carried to the Department and the previous list is secured from the Department. The deletions are not specifically called to the attention of the Department. It was pointed out that during the contemplated review of Security Index cases by the Department, the Department may pass on an individual for retention and the Bureau may remove this individual based on additional information received. The question is should we notify the Department of each instance where we remove a subject from the Security Index and the reason therefor.

It was pointed out that over the years since we started to maintain the Security Index, the Bureau has decided who shall be on the list and who shall come off the list on the premise that we are better able to judge the potential dangerousness of the subject. Any deletions from the list on the part of the Bureau are based on the fact that the subject no longer meets the standards set up by the Bureau and, therefore, no longer is considered dangerous.

On the other hand, any action taken by the Department to remove a subject as a result of its review of these cases will be the entire responsibility of the Department.

It was also pointed out that as a result of our interview program we have developed a number of confidential informants and a number of potential confidential informants, for which reason the subjects have been removed from the Security Index. If we advise the Department of the identities of persons removed and the reason therefor, we will necessarily disclose these informants.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation:

The Conference unanimously recommended that we should not advise the Department of the deletions made from the list inasmuch as we keep the Department advised on a monthly basis of the identities of those persons whom we consider potentially dangerous. The Conference recommended that we continue our present procedure of removing subjects from the Security Index where sufficient cause is shown reflecting that a subject is no longer potentially dangerous.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

In the event you agree with the recommendations of the Executives' Conference, we will be governed accordingly in the handling of the Security Index, and an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared for the field.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

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847A

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM :  
SUBJECT: FORM FD-186 SECURITY INDEX CARDS  
SUGGESTION #818 SUBMITTED BY THE  
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

DATE: August 6, 1951

*General*  
*ch 9.1*

PURPOSE

To recommend that the suggestion from the San Diego Office for adding items of information to Form FD-186 not be adopted.

DETAILS

Suggestion #818 submitted by San Diego on July 13, 1951, is attached.

This suggestion is that three items; position in Party, source and date, and evaluation, be added to Form FD-186 in order that this form would supply all necessary information for either the Security Index or the Communist Index card. It was pointed out that the clerical employees in the Field using this form would not have to write a routing slip to the Agents handling the case, for which this form is being utilized, for needed information.

Form FD-186 is a form recently prepared at the Bureau and furnished to the Field which contains a listing of the items which should appear on the back of the Security Index cards in the Field. Two copies of Form FD-186 are attached for your perusal.

OBSERVATIONS

It is not believed that this suggestion should be adopted inasmuch as the information suggested for inclusion in the Form FD-186 is not information which should necessarily be in the possession of the Agents apprehending the subjects of Security Index cards. The information suggested is information which should be included in the Communist Index card.

It was intended that the Form FD-186 be utilized solely for the preparation of the information which should be placed on the back of the Security Index card on file in the Field Office Security Index. To add the suggested information to the form at this time would necessitate the replacement of a large supply of these forms, which have recently been furnished to the Field.

I feel that the information suggested by San Diego for inclusion in the form can well be handled by the Agents at the time they prepare the Form FD-186 by placing the information on a separate slip when routing it to the clerk responsible for the preparation of the Security Index cards and the Communist Index cards.

RECOMMENDATION

If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division to advise them that the Security Division recommends that Suggestion #818 not be adopted.

(12) Scars and Marks:

(13) Peculiarities:

(14) Occupation:

(15) Marital Status:

(16) Immediate Relatives (including the number of minor children):

(17) Nationality:

(18) Country of Birth:

(19) Fingerprint Classification:

(20) FBI or Police Number:

(21) Criminal Record, showing sources:

(22) Social Security Number:

(23) Seamen's Certificate Number:

Check following:

Should subject be tabbed for Detcom ( ), Comsab ( ).

ENC. 1

849X

TO:

DATE:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

FILE NO:

Section 87C, 3b(4), Manual of Instructions, directed the description and photograph should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index Card. In regard to the photograph, the most recent one should be used if there is a choice. A review of the subject's file reflects there is - is not - a photograph of the above-captioned subject available for placing with the Security Index Card. (If more than one photograph is available, the Agent handling the investigation should indicate the photograph to be used.)

A review of the subject's file also reflects the following to be the most complete and current description of the subject, which description should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index card at the time it is made up:

(1) Name and Aliases:

(2) Sex:

(3) Race:

(4) Age:

(5) Residence:

(6) Height:

(7) Weight:

(8) Build:

(9) Hair:

(10) Eyes:

(11) Complexion:

ENC 2

850 changed to

4-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 10-8-51

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Birmingham  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
VERIFICATION OF MEMBERS.

Rebulet 10-5-51.

The information requested was furnished the Bureau by mylet dated July 14, 1951, marked confidential, entitled COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, DISTRICT 27, Birmingham Division, (SECURITY INDEX), INTERNAL SECURITY-C.